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1. Executive Summary
1.1.Introduction
This study was commissioned by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) to build on existing work on
third sector1 partnerships undertaken by the Third Sector Research Centre (TSRC) (Rees at al 2012 a and b). 
The main focus of this work was on partnership structures, drivers and barriers, processes impacts and
learning from partnership working.
Work on Northern Ireland housing partnerships was undertaken by the University of Ulster and Queen͛s 
University Belfast in partnership with TSRC. This focused on case studies of social housing Procurement 
Groups (PGs) and Supporting People (SP) Partnerships. The former included case studies of two of the three 
PGs between 2011 and 2012, while the latter focused on two community based schemes with mental health
and homeless service users. 
These are examples of ͚mandated partnerships͛ linked to public procurement and commissioning processes
with several layers of regulation. As such these provide examples of the construction of ͞auditable 
organisations͛ where effectiveness is influenced by relationships external to the partnerships/ The report 
therefore places particular emphasis on procurement, commissioning and regulation to understand the 
drivers of these partnerships and to a large extent their structure, operation and effectiveness.
The report uses the term hybridity to describe organisations that have a mixture of state, market and
private sector characteristics; partly as a result of their origins and mission and partly in response to
external drivers. State policy influences include the Concordat between the Voluntary and Community
Sector and the Northern Ireland Government, (Department for Social Development (DSDNI) 2011) as well as 
procurement and regulatory drivers outlined above. Market influences include commercial and business 
plan drivers that affect the relationship between housing associations (HAs) and support providers in SP 
partnerships. Third Sector influences involve civil society roots and independence from the state and may
also include legitimacy and trust, professionalism and the key advantage for HAs of their borrowing being
treated as non-government for the purpose of public accounts.
The unifying feature of the two case studies is that they concern voluntary and community sector 
organisations delivering public services. Taken together the two programmes considered here (the Social
Housing Development Programme and the SP Programme) account for around half of total Government 
funding to the Voluntary and Community sector in NI. Moreover, these are both fields in which voluntary
and community providers have a long-standing dominance for several reasons. In one case because of
substitution for NIHE as developers of new social housing to exploit the borrowing advantages of HAs, in the 
other because of the comparative advantage of the voluntary and community sector in social care, building
on community roots, legitimacy and professionalism.
While delivery of services by voluntary and community sector organisations has a number of advantages as 
set out above, there are also perceived disadvantages from the perspective of public procurement. 
Independence is seen as reducing scope for public control, their limited scale and resources as reducing 
ability to bear risk and enable scale economies and on occasions a perceived lack of professionalism. A
mirror image set of disadvantages arise from the perspective of voluntary and community organisations 
themselves including potential loss of independence and sacrifice of mission for mandate. The Concordat 
referred to above was an attempt to balance these positions, but is generally less influential than
procurement and commissioning in establishing relationships between Government and voluntary and
community providers of public services.
1 
In NI the terminology voluntary and community sector is preferred to describe these non-profit, non-governmental, 
civil society organisations.
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1.2. Case Study Research
The two case study fields have a number of distinct features illustrated in Table 3.1. The most important
distinction is that SP partnerships are 1-2-1 scheme based partnerships between HAs and support providers,
whereas PGs are larger groupings of organisations but comprise only HAs. SP partnerships are more 
important to support organisations than to HAs in relation to turnover and staffing, and this can lead to
power imbalances. Meanwhile PGs involve only a small number of HA staff but are strategically important 
to HAs and to the sector.
The case study research objectives were derived from the overall project research aims:
To explore the nature of different forms of third sector partnership;
 
To trace the key drivers for PGs;
 
To review their operation, relative advantages and any barriers to their effectiveness;
 
To consider innovation and learning from partnership processes;
 
To put forward some alternative visions for the future shape of the sector bearing in mind the policy
 
and funding contexts, and drawing from experience elsewhere in the UK. 

There were two partnership case studies in each policy field. The evidence base comprises 79 interviews 
with experts, officials, managers, staff and board members in the partner organisations in August 2011, May 
2012 and August 2012. Case studies were contextualised through policy and literature reviews and expert
interviews. Case Study reports were completed in October 2012 and findings were validated and discussed 
in a workshop convened by NIHE in November 2012. A small number of further comments were received 
from Government officials and used inform the drafting of this final report. 
1.3.Supporting People Partnerships
Nature of Programme and Partnerships
Supporting People is a wide ranging programme providing housing related support services to enable
people to live as independently as possible. It brings together at least three separate policy agendas–
homelessness, community care, and the management of potentially disruptive or dangerous individuals.
In Northern Ireland a single ring-fenced SP budget is managed by the NIHE, but accountable to the 
Department for Social Development DSD. Commissioning involves a range of statutory bodies and the 
viability of SP schemes depends on a cocktail of funding including SP grant, Housing Benefit, and in some
cases additional social care funding for people with care packages. HA partners mix housing association
grant and private borrowing to fund construction and require rental income to repay loans and finance 
maintenance and improvements. Both partners may make other contributions from reserves, charitable 
income or voluntary effort.
Most individual supporting people partnerships have been remarkably stable but have had their ͚ups and
downs͛ ͚usually involving money͛/ Often, partnerships were formed quite rapidly at the point at which the 
housing was constructed and have remained constant ever since. Disparity in power between HAs and their
partners typically involves transfer of risk (in relation to occupancy levels and rental income) to the support 
provider through joint management agreements (JMAs) or service level agreements (SLAs). Ultimately the 
HA can substitute a new support provider at the end of the contract period, but this rarely happens in
practice. Support providers can not generally substitute alternative landlord services within an existing
scheme.
Drivers
NIHE manages the commissioning process for SP Grant on an annual basis; it may de-commission or re-
commission schemes on the basis of changing needs, obsolescent housing, or adverse performance ratings 
under the Quality Assurance Framework (QAF) audit process. 
5
 
  
 
 
    
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
Third sector housing partnerships
Policy drivers include the Supporting People Strategy and NIHE Homelessness Strategy (both recently 
published to for the period up to 2015) and the Bamford Review of services for people with mental health 
problems and learning difficulties which provided funds to move long stay care patients into the 
community. These policy and funding frameworks create the context for scheme commissioning.
Unlike GB, the funding for SP in NI is ring-fenced, meaning that it cannot be transferred to other
programmes as it has by English Local Authorities. The core budget has been static for the last few years
(and therefore declining in real terms)/ ut ͚amford͛ funding has been added as described above/
HA partners experienced strong market drivers resulting from need to repay loan debt and weaker third
sector identities drawing on their community origins. SP providers have stronger third sector identities
associated with values, mission and professionalism and ability to harness additional resources from
volunteering, charitable donations and corporate social responsibility contributions.
Structures and Operation
SP partnerships are one-to-one scheme based relationships between HAs and support providers in the
voluntary and community sector. Some support providers have developed multiple schemes with the same 
HA partner, others have multiple HA partners. 
Partnerships are managed by joint management agreements (JMAs) and sometimes by service level 
agreements (SLAs). These agreements specify the relationship between the partners and allocate 
responsibilities for matters such as occupancy levels, rent collection, service quality and other services. They
were generally seen in case studies as placing more obligations on support providers than on HAs. Periodic 
meetings are held at a variety of levels between the partners and with the commissioner to manage these 
contracts and account for Supporting People grant. 
QAF inspections are held by NIHE to regulate the quality of service provided to users. Social care providers
are also regulated by the Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority (RQIA) which includes 
management and staff issues. The support providers visited also had rigorous internal audit systems. 
However, they did not perceive an excessive regulatory burden since these activities were regarded as
important for quality services that meet the needs of users. 
Where scheme residents are placed by Health and Social Care Trusts there may be additional funding for
care needs as in the case of the Bamford programme. However, there have been some problems in co-
ordinating this funding stream with SP and HA capital funding leading to some significant delays in the
programme. Solutions have been suggested to relocate this entire budget with the Health Trusts, but it is
not clear how this would ensure release of care funding.
The use of intelligent commissioning (Audit Commission, 2007) rather than public procurement has aided 
the development of longer term relationships between the partners (see p.13). This approach has involved
NIHE undertaking needs assessments, understanding supplier skills and expertise, matching SP providers 
with HA partners, allocating grants and quality review through QAF. 
The continued treatment of SP payments as grants rather than fees imposes financial constraints on support 
providers. Conditions of grant that prevent the recycling of savings or the virement of funds between years
prevents support providers from ͚trading͛ as social enterprises/ !n outcomes based system might 
benchmark providers to identify required public resources for a given service level, but could allow more 
efficient providers to reinvest surpluses rather than clawing these back. 
Learning
SP partnerships have strong connections to the public sector, often relying on links with public bodies for
the intake and discharge of service users, and are subject to several regulatory regimes. In the 
homelessness case study there were examples of barriers to efficient occupancy of schemes arising from
external control over intake and discharge by NIHE area offices.
6
 
  
 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
  
 
 
  
   
 
 
  
  
  
 
   
  
    
   
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
   
Third sector housing partnerships
Partnerships work best where there are reduced competitive pressures, particularly in cases where the HA
rules out moving into the same service delivery field as the voluntary and community sector partner.
ompetition risks a less open approach to sharing budgetary information, ͚gaming͛ over client needs levels
and added value and limiting outcomes to those that are specified and funded.
The third sector identity and ethos of support providers is an important resource that can be harnessed to
bring additional inputs and higher quality outcomes. Examples include a gym funded through corporate
social responsibility and international volunteers to work on additional services.
Intelligent Commissioning, although less transparent than outcomes based procurement, supports the 
development of longer term trust-based relationships that have proved particularly valuable for establishing
new schemes and provides greatest potential to secure added value. This approach has remained open to
new providers, as in the case of the homelessness provider brought in from the Republic of Ireland for its 
expertise in working with the most vulnerable homeless users.
The almost complete absence of formal user involvement in the partnerships, except in the consumer 
advisory role of the kind adopted in the mental health case study, is typical of many public services in NI. In
one case study this absence had been an issue in the QAF regulatory process. There is a need to examine
whether more formal user engagement might improve the effectiveness of inter-agency partnerships from
the perspective of the ultimate beneficiaries. Co-production and personalisation provide two mechanisms
that might deepen user involvement.
1.4.Procurement Groups
Nature of Programme and Partnerships
The Social Housing Development Programme (SHDP) is the funding mechanism for new social housing in NI.
HAs match allocations from this budget with private borrowing to build new homes to meet housing need.
From 2008 developing HAs were required to join a procurement group (PG) through which the SHDP would
be managed. However, individual HAs continued to receive funding allocations and to be responsible to the
regulator for their performance.
Three PGs of different sizes and membership have operated since 2009. The smallest had 5 HA members
and the largest 12 HA members in 2011-12. Stock in management ranged from 7,500 homes in the smallest 
to 18,000 in the largest. The combined stock of all three groups (33,000) is smaller than the top 10 HAs in
GB, limiting the scope for procurement savings.
Drivers
Key drivers were perceived to be European Union (EU) procurement rules and requirements to improve
performance and efficiency. Comparison between the four UK jurisdictions (Table 5.1) indicates that 
considerable leeway exists in the implementation of public procurement policy, with Northern Ireland at the
prescriptive end of the spectrum.
The idea for PGs did not emerge from the sector itself, even though the sector was considering alternative
options such as a single procurement group for bulk purchases. Indeed, little attempt was made to explain
or discuss the rationale for this particular solution to generate scale economies. The mandatory nature of
PGs has changed partnership working in the HA sector. 
The policy coincided with Ministerial statements advocating a reduction in the number of HAs; however, 
civil servants are clear that there were no direct links between the two. The high level of regulatory 
intervention against HAs during its introduction also provided a difficult context in which to introduce the 
policy. Both these coincidental developments affected actors͛ perceptions of PGs/ 
Structures and Operation
The policy and strategy structures within which PGs operate were largely prescriptive and process-based 
rather than outcome-focused.
7
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Individual HAs remain accountable for the management of the programme and this arguably preserves the
role of their boards in the accountability chain. There is variation in the extent to which board members are
involved in the governance of the different PGs and this reflects the lack of guidance on this matter in an 
otherwise very prescriptive framework.
Links to the public sector have dominated. The third sector status of HAs and their umbrella body has had
little or no relevance in the decision on partnership structures and there is no voice for service users. The
private sector has also been marginalised – the construction sector is indirectly included in the process but 
private lenders on which future development depends are not. 
Membership of groups was self-selected on the basis of difference rather similarity: they were diverse in
terms of size, geographical remit and type of housing provided. Case study groups chose different initial 
patterns of response with different structural and governance features. The two cases studies moved in
different directions over the period of the study (see Table 5.3), One chose to establish itself as a legal entity
whereas the other operates through a partnership agreement, in the spirit of a more voluntary trust based 
consortium arrangement. In practice, collaboration and trust were better correlated with performance than
legal structures and top down control.
Pressure for single development teams was a litmus paper issue, revealing the strengths and weaknesses of
power dynamics within groups as well as the process-oriented approach of DSD. While the voluntary based 
consortium succeeded in integrating some development functions in a virtual team, the legal entity case 
encountered opposition and was unable to impose a single team.
The two most important actors in the decision-making environment were the two government 
departments: Department of Finance and Personnel (DFP) for overall procurement policy and DSD for 
monitoring and regulation. Private lenders were not involved in policy networks at all. This highlights the 
degree to which HAs were being treated as bodies subject to public control. The third sector identities of
HAs appeared to play a quite limited role in the operation of the PGs, however in one case there was an 
emphasis on values based collaboration and independence with positive results for performance.
Implications of public sector control for the independence of HAs and the ability of their private borrowing
to remain off balance sheet was queried by some research participants.
Learning
The process of establishing frameworks was not as straightforward as had been portrayed in the 
Procurement Strategy. One case study procurement group had expanded procurement into a number of 
areas whilst another had proceeded on a narrower base. The relationships between structures, processes 
and outcomes were also variable as Table 5.3 illustrates. 
Cost savings were made on contracts but there was concern that this had been at the expense of passing on
more onerous client responsibilities to ensure quality was maintained. There were also problems of
attribution, since contract costs were falling everywhere as a result of recession. One group claimed that it 
was the Procurement Strategy rather than the PGs that generated savings and performance improvements.
While one group moved from reluctant compliance to recognising some real benefits through a 
collaborative trust based process, the other which had initially been enthusiastic felt that there was little 
benefit in continuing with their group due to the absence of control based sanctions. This evidence supports 
the role of trust and collaboration as essential partnership agreements and the limitations of an externally
mandated approach if control sanctions are not maintained.
As externally mandated partnerships that were not initially based on strategic engagement by the 
organisations involved PGs seem to be a case of the types of partnerships most likely to fail (Rees et al 
2012). Moreover, these structures may also constrain the formation of new trust based collaboration
opportunities (e.g., mergers across PGs). This would support the logic of any future PGs being voluntary
rather than mandatory.
8
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There was very limited opportunity for tenants as end users to influence partnership structures, operations
or to have a say in what the outcomes should be. This is a common finding with the SP case study and is an 
important consideration for future design of commissioning and partnerships. 
It is important for the effective development of housing strategy in Northern Ireland that there is learning
from this process and the value of trust, voluntary engagement and user influence as key success conditions 
for partnerships is better understood.
1.5.Conclusions
The main conclusions in relation to four of our five research questions are summarised above for each of 
the case studies. In the conclusion to our report (section 5) we also draw attention to comparisons between 
the case studies, future scenarios and cross-cutting issues. 
The main cross-cutting issues concern the role of voluntary and community sector providers and the extent
to which this is embraced by policy and funding mechanisms in the two cases. By and large the added value 
that these organisations can bring does not appear to be recognised in day to day policy making and
implementation. In practice the Voluntary and Community Sector Concordat is a much weaker influence
than the adoption of procurement based approaches, including a move away from intelligent 
commissioning in relation to SP. To survive as support providers voluntary and community sector providers 
are expected to grow larger through merger and to focus on meeting service specifications rather than their
own organisational missions. 
Yet in the case studies we found considerable evidence of the advantages of engaging voluntary and
community organisations in partnerships to improve service delivery and to employing collaborative and
trust based mechanisms to do so. In the SP cases, through their third sector status support, providers were 
able to bring in additional resources from charitable and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) contributions 
and volunteering and to use these to add value to services. In the PG cases most progress was through trust
based collaboration rather than hierarchy and sanctions.
Future scenarios highlight the need to do more with less as austerity continues, with threats to the stability
and viability of existing arrangements. It appears likely that top down procurement approaches will 
continue to displace intelligent commissioning with resultant change to the provider landscape in both case 
study fields with fewer providers and less voluntary sector contributions. 
Future approaches to partnerships should build on the lessons of this report to avoid sacrificing the
distinctive contribution of voluntary and community organisations for short term gains in efficiency and
standardisation. In the longer term the added value that these organisations can provide will be of even 
greater importance. Managing with fewer resources while maintaining a degree of social order will require 
support providers that harness civil society links rather than weakening these links through marketisation
and top-down regulation. Once lost, these specialist third sector inputs will prove almost impossible to
replace; however a sustainable platform for the future will also require greater influence for service users
than either case study demonstrated.
9
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2. Introduction  
Partnership working is nowadays a seemingly ubiquitous aspect of the management and delivery of public 
services, yet there remain major differences of view about what partnerships are for and how they best 
work for the different stakeholders they involve. This project evolved from a generic study of recent 
developments in partnerships involving what are known in Great Britain as third sector organisations, but 
which in Northern Ireland would be more commonly described as voluntary and community organisations. 
That study (Rees et al 2012a) built on a detailed evidence review (Rees et al 2012b) and used five depth case 
studies from different parts of the third sector to explore the meaning of partnership in the light of recent 
changes in governance, funding and policy. Some case studies were of partnerships between single 
organisations, others were broader sectoral studies including studies of the Work Programme and HA 
mergers in England assisting the study to identify broad impacts of partnerships and changes to the 
organisational landscape of public service delivery. The study included a Northern Ireland case study based 
on the first phase of work on supported housing partnerships and social housing PGs that were developed 
to provide the basis for this more detailed and longitudinal research report.  
The TSRC report (Rees et al 2012a) considered partnership structures, drivers and barriers, partnership 
processes and organisational change and the impacts of partnership working. It used this analysis to identify 
key learning from partnerships and to develop future scenarios. Amongst the challenging conclusions of the 
report were: 
 the difficulty in isolating the effects of individual partnerships given the complex patterns of 

multiple partnerships that most organisations engaged in simultaneously;
  
 the tension between trust-based and mandated forms of partnership and between competition and 
 
collaboration;
  
 the importance of organisational culture in the effectiveness of partnerships since ͞culture eats 
strategy for breakfast͟- and 
 the tendency for service users to be ͞silent voices͟ in setting partnership aims of assessing 
outcomes and the lack of hard evidence on partnership outcomes.  
One finding from the TSRC report that appeared to apply across the board was the importance of 
partnership structures in transforming the organisational landscape. For example staged groups-mergers-
integrated organisations, supply chain relationships and economies of scale on the one hand or economies 
of scope on the other were all changing the organisational map.  The report concluded that in the future 
there are only going to be very ͚messy͛ solutions/ However, many of these may turn out to be innovative 
and productive – just as tidiness often led to stasis in the past, untidiness may allow dynamic change in the 
future. 
More practically the report considered what makes for effective partnerships, and these lessons were 
highlighted in a subsequent ESRC (2013) policy briefing on the project that has been well received by English 
local authorities and third sector umbrella bodies. There were five main policy related findings. First, trust-
based partnerships are more effective than mandated partnerships and imposed competition and this 
needs to be recognised in the Government͛s desire to contract for specified outcomes and to minimise 
public expenditure. Second, currently the design of national programmes is dominated by economies of 
scale, employing payment by results, prime contractors and supply chains. However, economies of scope 
should be given greater consideration to promote long-term efficiency. Third, there needs to be an explicit 
focus on outcomes that reflect the perspectives of service users. Otherwise these perspectives will continue 
to be crowded out by the outcomes determined by managerial considerations, the public purse and 
incentives for investors. Fourth, to promote more effective partnerships, commissioning arrangements 
should be less prescriptive, give greater recognition to multiple outcomes and allow for more relational 
approaches to contracts. Fifth, the relationship between civil society compacts and concordats and the 
procurement and commissioning of public services needs to be re-balanced. Too often the principles of 
these two policies are at odds – in practice, incentives are loaded towards statutory agencies contracting 
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with large scale private sector suppliers, rather than civil society organisations or small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs).  
Work on housing partnerships in Northern Ireland provided one of the case studies in that wider project and 
the opportunity to reflect on similarities and differences from Great Britain. In this current project a further 
opportunity was provided to take a longer view of the evolution of the two selected housing partnerships in 
Northern Ireland: HA PGs and Supporting People (SP) partnerships between HAs and voluntary and 
community sector support providers. These case studies were conducted between Spring 2011 and Autumn 
2012 enabling a good understanding to be built of how partnerships change over time and how they relate 
to changes in the external environment, especially in relation to funding and regulation.  
The workshop held in November 2012 and subsequent written comments received from a small number of 
participants, mainly from Government officials, has helped in the presentation of this report, particularly in 
framing Part 2 of this report which we have used to clarify some of our terminology and approach. For 
example in relation to mandate, forms of procurement, commissioning and regulation, the roles played by 
third sector or voluntary and community organisations and our underlying concepts of state, market, and 
civil society as drivers of these relationships, and the use of the term ͚hybridity͛ to describe the way in which 
these drivers are often mixed within organisational structures and decision-making in mixed markets.  
Part 3 of the report then introduces the two partnership case study fields (each with two organisational 
partnership case studies) and outlines the research methodology. Part 4 provides detailed evidence from 
the SP case study, while Part 5 does the same for the social housing PGs case study. Part 6 presents detailed 
conclusions from each case study and compares findings before going on to outline some future scenarios. 
A detailed bibliography is provided enabling readers to track the research process, source materials and 
more general conceptual underpinnings. 
2.1. Mandated Partnerships and the role of Procurement, Commissioning and 
Regulation 
Like many of the partnerships considered in the wider TSRC study, both Northern Ireland case studies 
involve an external governmental partner that procures or commissions public services from voluntary and 
community sector providers and monitors and regulates these organisations and the services they deliver. 
These may therefore be regarded as ͚mandated partnerships͛ in that there is an external mandate to which 
organisations within the partnerships must have regard, and this may reduce the voluntary nature of the 
partnership and ability of members to determine activities and outcomes through internal agreement 
alone. Mandated partnerships tend to have a strong external focus, and can be contrasted to pure networks 
where the agreement of network partners is required for collaboration to occur and in which a major 
success ingredient is trust. There are doubts in the literature about whether management of networks and 
partnerships can function effectively with hierarchically imposed objectives or whether goals are necessarily 
emergent and based on shared learning between actors most involved in partnership processes, since ͚clear 
(and imposed) goals can make the actor deaf and blind͛ (de ruijn and ten Heuvelhof, 2008 p/65)/  
In England, Government is pressing ahead with a wide menu of public service reform that envisages a 
strategic commissioning role for government, delivery chains integrating public, private and third sector 
suppliers, and much more expansive use of payment by results (PbR). Thus commissioning and regulation 
have become even more important drivers for collaboration than under the previous government. These all 
have implications for the way in which third sector organisations (TSOs) enter into partnerships for service 
delivery, with each other and with public agencies and private sector organisations. (Rees et al 2012b).  
These developments led us to focus within our study on the changing approaches taken to procuring and 
commissioning services from the voluntary and community sector and to ensuring governmental outcomes 
are met through various forms of regulation. Following some of the comments received on our case study 
reports it was clear that we needed to explain the way in which we have used this terminology and to 
introduce the main forms of external influence that we observed in the case study partnerships. There is an 
important distinction between procurement and commissioning, as Macmillan notes. ͚Procurement is the 
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Third sector housing partnerships
range of processes involved in purchasing goods and services from provider organisations, in whatever 
sector. Commissioning is a broader set of service delivery processes which involve consultation, needs
assessment and service planning and design. If procurement is about shopping, commissioning is about 
deciding what to buy and how͛ (Macmillan, 2010, p 9)/
The PGs case study provided an opportunity to review the emergence of procurement policy in Northern
Ireland and to compare this to developments elsewhere in the UK, focusing on the example of procuring
new social housing. EU Directives enacted as the Public Contracts Regulations 2006, with amendments in
2009 and 2011 provide the platform from which the HA PGs developed. HAs count as public sector bodies 
for procurement purposes under Public Sector Directive 2004/18. Public procurement is a devolved matter 
but it is implemented in close conjunction with other UK jurisdictions under the terms of a 2001 Concordat 
between the Northern Ireland Executive and the UK Government2. Section 5.1 provides an account to the
policy background to the application of procurement policy to social housing in NI and how this led to
requirements for specific forms of partnership. 
The Supporting People case study was more concerned with historic forms of commissioning associated
with the SP grant regime to voluntary and community providers of support services. In its relationships with
SP providers NIHE appeared to have been strongly influenced by the ͞intelligent commissioning͟ model for
engaging with voluntary and community sector providers promulgated by the former Audit Commission in 
their ͞Hearts and Minds͟ report (!udit ommission, 2007)/ This advocates that commissioners should think 
carefully about the kind of services that they want to procure for a range of service users, the types of 
organisations that are likely to be able to deliver at an affordable price and ͞how best to construct a 
commissioning process that will ensure that a variety of delivery organisations have the opportunity and
incentive to deliver services, where they are well placed to do so, and that they receive funding in the most
appropriate form͟ (!udit ommission 2007 p/ 4)/ This approach has involved NIHE undertaking needs 
assessments, understanding supplier skills and expertise, matching SP providers with HA partners, allocating
grants and quality review through QAF. In many ways this approach seems at odds with the more 
competitive and cost driven approaches associated with procurement and indeed with more recent versions
of commissioning aligned to payment by results. The latter approaches appear to pay much less attention to
capturing the specific benefits of voluntary and community sector providers or to constructing
commissioning and funding arrangements that do not disadvantage smaller community based providers.
In this report we use the term regulation generically to cover the plethora of external controls and
requirements that are imposed on organisations as a condition of working in particular sectors. Power has
documented the growth of an ͚audit society͛ in which ͞people are constantly checking up on one another͟
(Power 1997, p.1). Management reform of public services in the UK and elsewhere generated a huge
increase in regulatory activity, especially where services were outsourced to voluntary and community
providers or to the private sector. Functions of regulation may include accountability for use of public funds, 
protection of consumers and managing risk through standardised processes. Regulation may also give
comfort to private funders and investors and is sometimes used to pursue wider public policy agendas such
as equality and procurement policies. Hood et al (1998) noted the growth of regulation inside government 
to create ͞auditable organisations͟ subject to inspection, monitoring and audit regimes, often incorporating
self-regulation and compliance certification. The growth of such regulation inside Government has 
frequently been questioned since the burden of regulation can significantly increase costs for regulated
organisations and for regulators and such costs must be justified, especially in the post 2008 context of
austerity. Furthermore there is often seen to be a trade-off between regulation and innovation with 
regulation sometimes depicted as stifling risk taking. In response to these tensions principles of good
regulation tend to emphasise proportionality, transparency, a focus on outcomes rather than process and
͞earned autonomy͟ for high performing organisations (abinet Office, 2005)/ More recently, principles 
2 
 http://www.dfpni.gov.uk/index/procurement-2/cpd/cpd-policy-and-legislation/ni-pp-policy/cpd-
concordat-on-public-procurement.htm Last accessed 6th November 2012. 
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Third sector housing partnerships
developed by Sir Philip Hampton in 2005 are cited by the Better Regulation Delivery Office3 to inform the 
UK's regulatory regime; these include risk assessment to focus regulation in areas where it is most needed, 
no inspection without a reason, no duplication of information collected, no new regulators where existing
ones can do the work. 
Both studies also involved considerable elements of regulation. Indeed the Procurement Group case study
was primarily focused on the response of HAs to externally imposed requirements to join PGs and work
towards certain structures and processes that were deemed to be consistent with good procurement. In the 
background of that case study was also a significant increase in regulatory interventions in the business of 
HAs following revised regulatory processes in the mid 2000s. These interventions resulted in the overall
performance of 14 out of 33 associations being categorised as ͚unacceptable͛ and the development 
performance of 10 out of 28 developing associations as ͚unacceptable͛ (Northern Ireland !udit Office
(NIAO), 2009); with seven HAs subsequently suspended from development. In the SP case study, all support 
providers are subject to double regulation from both the RQIA and the SP QAF framework. An increasingly 
important source of influence in how the schemes are managed is the Social Care Inspectorate, the 
Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority, with the power to re-designate schemes and in extreme 
cases close them down.4 QAF inspections are held by NIHE to regulate the quality of service provided to
users. In addition to external regulation our case studies revealed that SP providers often have rigorous
internal audit systems to satisfy their boards and management over and above external compliance. All this 
is consistent with the construction of ͞auditable organisations͟ subject to inspection, monitoring and audit 
regimes, as a key backdrop to the mandated partnerships for new housing construction and housing related
support services in NI.
3 
Better Regulation – the Hampton Principles http://www.bis.gov.uk/brdo/resources/knowledge/better-regulation-
principles
4 
One scheme closed earlier in 2012 as a result of a RQIA closure order leading to the withdrawal of the provider from
Northern Ireland altogether.
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Third sector housing partnerships
2.2.State, Market and Society Drivers and Hybridity
This report uses the term hybridity to describe organisations that have a mixture of state, market and
private sector characteristics. Following Billis (2010) it is common to distinguish organic forms of hybridity in
which voluntary membership organisations take on state and market characteristics as a result of their 
engagement in contracts, competition, and responses to political and policy control. Enacted hybridity
involves organisations having hybrid identities from the start, for example following transfer of public 
services such as housing to purpose made organisations with hybrid governance structures. 
Common state policy influences on all partner organisations include the devolved Northern Ireland
Assembly (Birrell 2009), the Concordat between the voluntary and community sector and the Northern
Ireland Government (DSDNI 2011a) and changes to the strategic framework and procedural guidelines for
Supporting People funding for housing-related support services (DSDNI 2012) and guidance for public 
procurement (2011, 2012a and b) and procurement of social housing (DSD 2008). Health and Social Care 
Boards provide complementary funding for some community health and care services following the 
͚amford͛ review (Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS), 2005, 2007)/ 
Homelessness services are influenced by the Homelessness Strategy (NIHE 2012) providing a framework for 
funding homelessness response and prevention services.
These State policy influences are just one of three main drivers affecting the organisational behaviour of
hybrid organisations such as HAs and TSO support providers (Billis 2010). Other drivers harness third sector 
identities and market based behaviour in which these organisations are nowadays increasingly involved.
Third sector identities are perhaps most apparent among the support providers, many of which grew from
civil society responses to social need, most of which are guided by a strong ethos and sense of social 
purpose and some of which have governance structures emphasising accountability to service users and
local communities. Many such providers emphasise their civil society roots and cherish their independence
from the state, leading to organisational adaptation rather than simple implementation of state policies.  
While these may be treated as rhetorical claims, there are often material resources attached to such claims. 
For example, voluntary identity may unleash volunteering and charitable fund raising for projects, leading to
trade-offs with statutory funding and state control and regulation. 
Market identities are most apparent among HA partners who now have extensive experience of business 
planning to manage significant streams of private borrowing. This nowadays exceeds state grants in funding
new housing schemes (although supported housing schemes may attract higher subsidy levels than general 
needs housing). Within their business plans, HAs have to raise sufficient rental income to repay loans and
cover ongoing management and maintenance costs and budget for longer term major repairs and re-
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Third sector housing partnerships
provisioning of obsolete accommodation. These market based logics influence the relationships that HAs 
have with TSO partners, for example, in relation to the terms of joint management agreements and service 
level agreements with regard to occupancy levels, rent collection and management and apportionment of 
risks.
Hybridisation refers to the increased mixing of state, market and third sector characteristics of organisations 
over time. Hybridisation is sometimes considered as a purposeful adaptive response by organisations to a
turbulent environment, for example by charities moving to more market or trading based methods of
income generation (Smith 2010). The importance of external drivers arising from change in the public policy
and funding environment is also increasingly recognised (Harris 2010). This report concerns processes of 
hybridisation of third sector organisations (TSOs) through case studies of partnerships between HAs and
TSO support providers in the mental health and homelessness fields and PGs of HAs set up to procure new 
build housing in Northern Ireland. It uses case studies to explore and illuminate the changing nature of 
these partnerships and the mechanisms promoting hybridisation. For example for mental health and
homeless support organisations hybridisation is increased through partnerships with HAs driven by the 
commercial approaches and practices of those organisations. 
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Third sector housing partnerships
2.3.The Role of Third Sector 
Following on from the discussion of state, market and society in 2.2, we need to clarify here why our study
focuses particularly on the role of third sector (voluntary and community sector) organisations and what 
particular issues this raises for housing partnerships. The Third Sector Research Centre at the University of 
Birmingham has for the last five years been exploring the changing nature of the third sector organisations 
in the UK, and a key area of enquiry has been its relationship with Government. This relationship has been
particularly affected by the growing involvement of third sector organisations in delivery of publicly funded 
services, and a recent series of ͞futures dialogues͟5 has been exploring consequences of this engagement 
for the distinctiveness and independence of the sector and the ways in which such engagement is 
structured; through commissioning, procurement and contracts on the one hand and compacts and 
concordats on the other. 
In collaboration with University of Ulster and later Queen͛s University, TSR sought to identify some of the
key policy fields in which these relationships are being played out in Northern Ireland. Analysis of the
Northern Ireland ouncil for Voluntary !ction (NIV!) ͞State of the Sector͟ reports and DSD website 
identified the importance of two policy fields in relation to flows of capital and grant funding to voluntary
and community sector organisations in NI. Two of the most significant streams of Government funding for 
the third sector in Northern Ireland are for housing support services funded through the Supporting People 
(SP) programme (£64m in 2009/10); and the procurement of new social housing developments (£155m in 
2009/10). These together accounted for around half of total Government funding to the NI Voluntary and
Community sector at that time6. 
Interestingly new social housing provision and housing related support services (SP) are both policy fields in 
which voluntary and community sector organisations have had a long-standing and dominant position in NI.
In new social housing provision this stems from two historical points of engagement with the state; first in
1974-6 when public funding was made available to HAs and the Corrymeela conference led to the 
emergence of a reinvigorated HA sector, later after 1996 when the NIHE newbuild programme was 
transferred to HAs to take advantage of the off balance sheet status of HA borrowing (Mullins, Rhodes and
Williamson 1999).
In SP, the establishment of a single funding stream for housing related support in fields such as 
homelessness, mental health, drug and substance misuse and probation and rehabilitation in 2003 led to
the formalisation of existing roles played by a number of specialist voluntary and community organisations 
in these fields and the formation of partnerships with HAs. Here it is argued that voluntary and community
organisations became the dominant providers because they were already active as a result of needs based 
responses to community issues and the development of specialist skills and relationships required to fulfil
these roles. This history gave these organisations the legitimacy and trust to take lead responsibility for 
providing personal support to vulnerable people in community settings and there were few obvious 
competitors in either the state or market sectors. 
From these two examples we can see some of the varied drivers that have led to voluntary and community
sector organisations being engaged in public service delivery. On the one hand, the availability of public 
funding through grant in aid and the financial advantages of non-public sector status in the case of HA
investment and borrowing. On the other hand, more intrinsic advantages such as specialist skills and
5 http://www.tsrc.ac.uk/Publications/FuturesDialogueBigPicturePapers/tabid/992/Default.aspx
6 According to the State of the Sector V almanac (NICVA 2009) total sector income from government 
(excluding HA development) was £259m in 2008. If we add in the HA development funding of £155m,
we can see that together this stream and the SP stream make up 53% of the £414m total.
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Third sector housing partnerships
relationships, trust and legitimacy through being embedded in civil society as more apparent amongst the 
SP providers. Billis and Glennerster(1998) use the theory of comparative advantage to explain why third
sector organisations predominate in certain fields such as social care where these advantages are at a 
premium. 
While government can benefit from harnessing independent third sector organisations to deliver service for
the variety of reasons set out above, it is important to recognise that there may also be perceived
disadvantages which may affect relationships and propensity to select third sector partners. First, even in
the most tightly worded contract there may be a tendency for outsourced services to deviate from
Government specifications of scope and purpose and particularly from prescribed processes and methods. 
The move to outcomes focused commissioning is a reaction to this danger of being overly prescriptive about 
process when the important thing is to focus on shared outcomes. Second, there is still a tendency in some
quarters to equate the voluntary sector with a lack of professionalism, particularly where third sector 
providers are operating on a smaller scale and working with volunteers for some elements of service 
delivery. Third, where the aim of outsourcing is to save money and transfer risk, smaller third sector 
providers may be seen to have insufficient resources and capacity to enable savings to be made by
operating at scale and to manage risk, especially with payment by results (PbR) approaches. Fourth, from
the perspective of third sector organisations themselves there can be perceived disadvantages of state 
funded service delivery where this compromises their independence, limits their ability to campaign and
leads to moves away from their core mission. 
Attempts to accentuate the positive aspects of third sector involvement while minimising some of these 
downsides have tended to focus on the development of compacts and concordats to govern the 
relationship between the state and the third sector across policy fields. Following on from the Deakin 
Commission (Deakin, 1996), voluntary sector compacts set out to regulate these relationships at national 
and local level. Key issues were the terms and conditions of commissioning and procurement, provision to
cover the core costs of third sector organisations and managing conflicts between mission and mandate. In
NI, a new ͚oncordat͛ was signed off at the end of 2010 specifying that ͚public sector bodies must be aware 
of the potential effects of their procurement arrangements and guard against any unintended and
unwelcome alteration to voluntary and community organisations͛ roles͛ (p/ 9)/ However, this horizontal tier
has been relatively weak in comparison to the vertical policy fields in which public spending such as new 
social housing and SP are structured. In practice delivery of general commitments to reduce bureaucracy, 
move to full economic costs and enable TSOs to compete for public contracts has been patchy and like the 
earlier ompact ͚not widely or consistently applied͛ (NI!O, 2010 p/ 7)/
3. Housing Partnerships: Case Study Research
Our preliminary mapping of these two sets of relationships of voluntary and community organisations with 
the state and associated organisational partnerships in 2011 is summarised in Table 3.1.The key differences 
between these two fields and the forms of partnership involving third sector organisations is apparent. 
While the first case involves small scale partnerships between two sub-sectors within the voluntary and
community sector, the latter involves only HAs but with more HA partners to accommodate. The services
provided differ between the more people orientated approach of SP and the more technical focus of 
housing development. Both examples include a core of stronger actors and a periphery of weaker actors
whose interests are affected by the partnerships. The importance of the partnerships to business turnover 
is another point of variation. In the SP case the partnerships are much more important to the support 
providers than to the HAs; in the PG case development is generally very important to HA business but the 
share of this funded by the state is falling with potential future implications for public procurement
regulation. Impacts on staff are greater for the SP support providers than for HA partners. PGs affected a 
narrow group of HA staff in the short term, but could have wider strategic ramifications for HA services
generally and for the umbrella body in the longer term.
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Table 3.1: Forms of Partnership in Two Case Study Fields
Supporting People New Build social housing
Sectors 
involved
HAs, & predominantly voluntary and
community sector support organizations 
Developing HAs
Services Housing related support for homeless Procurement of new build social housing and
involved people, people with mental health needs, 
people with learning disabilities, ex-
offenders, and other special needs 
(interviews focused on first 3 groups)
contractors framework in first instance
Maintenance and other procurement later
Who are the main partners?
Internal Usually 1-1 relationships between HAs 
and support providers regulated by joint
management agreements (JMAs) or 
service level agreements (SLAs). Support
providers may be involved in several 
partnerships with same HA or 
partnerships with several HAs.
Original 4 PGs range from 6 to 10 HA A HA
members represented by Exec staff rather than
board members. Now 3 PGs ranging from 5-10
members following 2 mergers.
External NIHE, and to much lesser extent Health & NIHE, DSD main external partners within public 
(powerful) Social Care Commission Board and Area 
H&SC Trusts, Regulators (QAF, RQIA, 
domiciliary area standards)
procurement framework set by NIA and Central
Procurement Group and DSD Inspection Unit
(eligibility for grant).
External Tenants and service users have very little Developers, private funders and contractors are 
(limited opportunity to influence not full partners but are affected by PG 
influence) frameworks. Private funders increasing importance 
not reflected in PGs. 
Tenants and service users have very little 
opportunity to influence.
How £64million p.a. of public funding for £155 million of grant funding p.a. 
important to housing related support. In some cases 
This is matched with a growing % of private
business this is matched with Health and Social
funding. 
turnover? Care Board funding.
SP forms substantial share of most 
support providers income and staff 
activity and this is recognised by NIHE 
focus on organisational health (reserves 
etc.).
However, it is of much less significance in
relation to most HA partners business 
turnover where rents from general needs
are much more important than
supported housing rents.
As public grants fall below 50% of scheme costs the 
dependencies of schemes on public funding change 
and compliance with private funders͛ requirements 
becomes more important, however as the case 
study illustrates this threshold has not yet been
seen as significant in reducing the case for Public 
procurement regulation to be applied to HAs. 
Almost all new HA building is involved.
Non-developing HAs were also affected by the 
requirement to join PGs.
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Supporting People New Build social housing
What SP is generally a small element of overall Development staff are the main group involved
proportion activity and staffing for most NI HA and have traditionally been seen as important 
of your staff partners, but a few specialist HAs employ within HAs despite relatively small nos. In some 
is involved? support staff and receive SP funding
direct. 
SP funded staff often very important part
of workforce for SP providers. 
small HAs development was handled by the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and/or development agent. 
PGs were expected to lead to mergers of 
development teams into single team for each
group. More HA staff will be affected as role of PGs 
expands, especially if mergers follow. Impact on
umbrella organizations also affected as 
relationships between PGs and Northern Ireland
Federation of Housing Associations (NIFHA 
developed.
Source: Research Team based on Case Studies and Expert Interviews
3.1.Partnerships Case Study Methodology
The case study research objectives were derived from the overall project research aims:
To explore the nature of different forms of third sector partnership;
 
To trace the key drivers for PGs;
 
To review their operation, relative advantages and any barriers to their effectiveness;
 
To consider innovation and learning from partnership processes;
 
To put forward some alternative visions for the future shape of the sector bearing in mind the policy
 
and funding contexts, and drawing from experience elsewhere in the UK. 

Our approach to studying partnerships was through structured case studies employing a common template 
for evidence collection and analysis. The aim was to work outwards from case study processes, structures
and events to identify the external drivers affecting partnership evolution, the types of structure adopted
for the partnerships, the internal partnership processes, outcomes and key learning. 
Both case studies captured the evolution of partnerships over time, but the Procurement Group case study
was able to capture change in two of the groups through a more longitudinal research design involving visits
and interviews with the same actors in 2011 and 2012. In the SP cases the return visits were over a shorter
period in 2012. In the SP cases a further design element was to use individual schemes as the lens through
which the relationships between the partners were observed.
The context for these partnerships was further explored through interviews with experts and regional policy
and representative bodies prior to, and in some cases following, the case study visits to follow up and
understand specific issues. Case Study workshops were held at NIHE in November 2012 to explore and
discuss the emerging issues and to assist in finalising case study reports. It had originally been planned to
place a consultation draft of the case study reports on the TSRC website to seek further feedback and
comments, but on advice from NIHE this was not taken forward. Instead, a ͚have your say͛ request was sent
to those who had taken part in the research, but unfortunately only a small number of responses were 
received, all of them from civil servants rather than from the case study organisations or umbrella bodies.
A total of 69 interviews were undertaken in the two case studies, some with national stakeholders and
experts, and the remainder with managers, staff and partners of the case study partnerships. Four 
partnerships were studied in all: two of the three Social Housing PGs and two SP partnerships based on one 
mental health scheme and one homelessness accommodation scheme. 
19
 
  
 
  
  
   
  
   
 
   
    
   
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
       
  
 
     
       
  
 
     
       
       
 
   
  
 
 
  
  
          
           
           
             
        
      
          
       
 
     
Third sector housing partnerships
3.1.1. Social Housing Procurement Groups
The research was carried out in three phases: an initial study in August 2011 (Mullins et al, 2012; Rees et al, 
2012); stakeholder interviews in May 2012 including selection of two PGs for more in-depth study; and the 
final phase in August 2012 which concentrated on the two selected groups. A total of 34 research contacts 
were made (Table 3.2). Those interviewed included: senior staff in HAs; HA and umbrella body Board
members; staff from two housing umbrella organisations; and Government bodies including the NIHE, the 
Department for Social Development (DSD) and the Northern Ireland Audit Office. Several stakeholders were 
interviewed more than once. The findings were contextualised within procurement policy across the UK and
within relevant academic literature. In response to comments on the draft version of this report, an e-mail
interview was carried out with a senior member of staff in a financial institution involved with lending to
HAs; a further meeting with two government officials was also held.
Table 3.2: Research interviews, procurement group case study 2011 and 2012
Stakeholder Phase 1: 
August 
2011
Phase
2A: May
2012
Phase
2B:
August 
2012
Post
consultation
on draft
Total
contacts
HA senior staff 5 4 9 18
HA or umbrella body
Board members
- 1 2 3
Umbrella body staff 3 1 1 5
Government including
NIHE
4 1 - 2 7
Financial institution 1 1
Total contacts 12 7 12 3 34
Note: Some stakeholders were interviewed in more than one phase.
Following the Phase 2A stakeholder interviews, it was necessary to select only two out of the three PGs to
study in greater detail, due to resource constraints. The two case studies are anonymised as Case Study A 
(CSA) and Case Study B (CSB). They were chosen due to their different organisational structures, working
relationships, and initial attitudes towards PGs: CSA had initially embraced the new approach with great
enthusiasm whereas CSB was more pragmatic.
3.1.2. Supporting People (SP) Partnerships
The two SP case studies were selected to reflect two of the main components of the SP
programme – mental health services and homelessness. They were chosen in the light of
preliminary findings from an initial round of stakeholder interviews conducted by the research 
team in August 2011 and again in early 2012, and in consultation with the NIHE and the Project
Advisory Group. Care was taken to screen out any partnerships where there was evidence of
serious known problems in relationships at the time of selection as this would have made the
research very difficult to conduct and raised ethical problems while risking focusing on exceptional
and specific cases rather than drawing out more general learning. 
It is important to note therefore that both case study partnerships were selected from those considered 
well managed and relatively stable. Interviews were conducted with CEOs/senior managers in May 2012
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Third sector housing partnerships
and again in August 2012 along with regional and operational management staff in the two selected
schemes. All interviews were recorded and transcribed and summary notes were made of each interview. 
The SP case studies were undertaken over a two year period (2011-12) and involved a total of 35 interviews
(Table 3.3) with third sector umbrella organisations (NICVA, NIFHA and Council for the Homeless; individual 
organisations providing homelessness and mental health services, HA partners and Government bodies 
including the NIHE, the Department for Social Development (DSD) and the Northern Ireland Audit Office. 
The study was contextualised by a review of housing and support policies in NI and across the UK and
relevant academic literature. Two in-depth case studies of housing support partnerships were conducted in 
the second wave of research in 2012, one from each of the selected fields (homelessness and mental 
health). 
Cases were selected in consultation with NIHE and the Project  Advisory Group. Case studies involved site 
visits to projects and interviews were conducted with CEOs/senior managers of HA and support partners in
May 2012 and again in August 2012 along with regional and operational management staff in the two
selected schemes. Interviews were recorded and transcribed and summary notes were made of each 
interview. Ethical review procedures were followed and each interviewee completed a consent form and
received a statement of aims and topics in advance of the interviews. Summary findings were provided to
all participants for comment and a workshop was held in November 2012. 
Table 3.3: Research interviews, Supporting People case study 2011 and 2012
Stakeholder Phase 1: 
August 
2011
Phase
2A: May
2012
Phase 2B:
August 
2012
Total
contacts
Government
Depts./Bodies 
3 2 3 8
Umbrella bodies 3 1 2 6
Managers and Staff in
Homelessness orgs
1 3 4 8
Managers and Staff in
Mental Health orgs 
2 3 4 9
HA partners 2 2 4
Total contacts 9 11 15 35
Note: Some stakeholders were interviewed in more than one phase.
Unlike the PGs study there was no opportunity to track the evolution of the individual partnerships by 
comparing findings in 2011 and 2012. Arguably this method would have been less useful here since these 
are generally much longer term partnerships than the PGs and little would have changed within individual 
case studies between the two years. However, the SP case study did retain an evolutionary focus in two
main ways. Firstly by backtracking with the HA and support partners to establish the history of their 
collaboration and the position of the case study scheme within this wider relationship. Secondly by tracking
the recent discussion and implementation of policy changes in the frameworks for SP, homelessness and
community care through review of policy documents and interviews with key policy and field actors. 
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Third sector housing partnerships
4. Supporting People Partnerships
4.1.Supporting People: the background and evolution of policy
The aim of Supporting People (SP), as stated in the draft Northern Ireland Supporting People strategy 2011-
15 (p/4), is to ͞improve the quality and effectiveness of support services0and help vulnerable people live as
independently as possible in the community͟/ Introduced in 2003 across the UK, it reformed the way
housing-related support was provided to vulnerable groups, and merged a large number of existing budgets
to create a substantial resource for grant funding of support services. While in GB this grant budget is 
administered by local authorities, in Northern Ireland a single funder, the NIHE, is responsible for funding
housing-related support services across the region.
The programme operates at the intersection of three main policy agendas: the role of social housing in 
addressing homelessness, community care, and the need to discipline and control people whose behaviour
is deemed anti-social (Carr 2005; Clarke et al, 2008; Parr 2010). It unifies in one programme the interests of 
three separate government functions: housing and in particular the operation of strategies on
homelessness, health and social care, and criminal justice.
SP was announced by the Government in December 1998 and introduced across the UK in 2003. It 
transferred money from Housing Benefit and many other sources to a single dedicated and much-enhanced 
budget. In England £6.6bn was set aside in the October 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review, but 
subsequently ring-fencing was removed, putatively in the interests of ͚localist͛ decision making/ In Northern
Ireland the budget in 2009-2010 of £64m remained ring-fenced  and was the single biggest source of 
funding available to third sector organisations (apart from the capital programme for new house building by 
HAs). However, four years of static budgets had led to greater pressure on commissioners and providers 
alike with limited scope to respond to new needs without terminating some existing grants.  Nevertheless 
the situation in Northern Ireland stands out when compared to other parts of the UK as the ring-fenced 
budget has protected the core services provided through the programme in contrast to England in 
particular, where in many areas services have been lost as local authorities have struggled to balance 
reduced budgets..
Resource allocation within the budget figures cited in the Supporting People draft strategy for 2011-15
shows the continuing dominance of community care related expenditure, with mental health and learning
disability together accounting for 39% of the budget and general homelessness for a further 22%. But the 
strategy notes that the mental health and learning disability are much more resource intensive, accounting
for just 16% of the supported housing units. The proportion of the budget taken up by community care
related groups – including older people and people with physical and sensory disabilities is now close to
60% (NIHE, 2012).
The evolution and financing of the programme account for its core features. Commissioning is the 
responsibility of the NIHE which exercises this function in conjunction with the NI Health and Social Care 
Board, relevant Health and Social Care Trusts and the Probation Board.  Service delivery is out sourced to
109 providers the vast majority of whom are in the voluntary and community sector.7 Whilst an increasing
proportion of the budget is devoted to what is called ͚floating support͛ – support to individual tenants in
͚general needs͛ housing, mainly in the private sector, most remains with specialist supported housing
schemes. Typically these are founded on partnership arrangements between HAs and specialist support 
providers, although in some cases HAs directly manage the support themselves. 
The combination of HA supply of accommodation and the involvement of specialist support providers, with
the underpinning role of housing benefit in meeting ongoing housing costs, has created a particular form of 
7 
DSD Government Funding database http://govfundingpublic.nics.gov.uk/GrantsAwarded.aspx (accessed
August 2012). The number of providers has reducing slowly as the result of mergers and withdrawals from the
programme.
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Third sector housing partnerships
partnership (analysed in more detail below). These partnerships have depended on trust built over years of 
inter-agency cooperation. This trust has in turn been underpinned by the service agreement funding model 
for the SP providers that has encouraged long-term relationships. However, the combination of part-
funding through private finance and housing benefit and the introduction of procurement-based funding
are creating risks of destabilising what has until now been a relatively stable, although complex, set of inter-
agency relationships.  In particular the evidence recounted below shows that there is a clash of institutional 
logics between HAs who need to charge commercial rents to guarantee returns on bank lending and the 
logics of support partners trying to provide high quality services and cover rental payments whilst 
depending upon locally capped housing benefit payments and static SP grants to deliver.  Balancing services,
income, and rental charges has been a growing source of business tension in relationships between scheme
providers and their HA partners. Based on discussions with case study organisations in 2012 highlighting the 
gap between scheme income and costs, it is likely that restrictions on the availability of housing benefit in 
the welfare reforms introduced in April 2013 could render some schemes unviable unless a new service or
funding model can be found. 
The outworking of these relationships is explored in the case studies. Drawn from provision of 
accommodation for homeless people and for those with chronic mental health problems, respectively, the 
two case studies also demonstrate the important influence of the respective policy contexts, notably in 
determining who controls access to the schemes, the role of budgets other than housing benefit and SP in 
determining scheme viability and the role of additional regulatory requirements.
4.1.1. Homelessness
Homelessness is one of the main needs areas to which SP funding is applied to enable service users to
receive varying levels of support required to make the transition to independent living. Ninety-three
supported accommodation schemes in NI are funded under the SP programme for homeless needs groups 
comprising homeless families, single homeless, domestic violence, offenders and substance misusers (North 
Harbour Consulting, 2012).
In 2011/12 a revised Homelessness Strategy was produced (NIHE 2012) to provide a framework for funding
homelessness response and prevention services in NI. Prevention and early intervention are an important 
part of the vision as is improving services to vulnerable homeless households and individuals. One if its key
aims is that through ͚enhanced inter agency cooperation, services to the most vulnerable homeless 
households will be improved͛ (p/7)/ 
This highlights the importance of partnerships such as those between HAs and support providers and it is
recognised that this will ͚require the collaboration of a wide range of partners from the statutory, voluntary
and community sectors͛ (p/7)/  !longside ͚transitional͛ and ͞episodic͟ homelessness, the strategy recognises 
the need to respond to ͚chronic homelessness, which tends to be long term users of emergency services, 
particularly rough sleepers͛(p/13)/ It is in the latter area that support providers such as the case study
organisation included in this study operate. 
The strategy adopts a pathways model (p.14) to show the links between housing and support initiatives in 
enabling successful transitions to suitable permanent accommodation.  Amongst the support services 
involved in this integrated approach are addiction services, domestic violence support, work with ex-
offenders, new migrants and youth homelessness; all of which are included in the SP programme.  This 
pathway model, is predicated on users spending up to two years in supported accommodation while
benefiting from support services/ This approach has been increasingly challenged by the ͚Housing First͛ 
approach which suggests that people are more able to benefit from support once they are in settled
accommodation (Tsemberis, Gulcur, and Nakae, 2004) . Thus as noted above and evidenced below, a small
but increasing proportion of the SP budget is now allocated for floating support for people in general needs 
housing. 
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Third sector housing partnerships
An appendix to the strategy (p.33) summarises the financial investment of £200 million in homelessness
services in NI since 2003 which includes the following budget lines for the 2010/11 investment of £36.1
million:
Temporary accommodation – housing benefit top up and SP – £30.7 million,
 
Homelessness services – furniture storage and exceptional costs – £920,000,
 
Voluntary sector funding – homelessness services – £2.2million,
 
Supporting People – floating support – £1.35million,
 
Private sector leased properties – £955,000.
 
There is evidence of an inclusive approach to the development of the strategy with 17 organisations 
reported as having responded to the consultation including umbrella bodies such as the Council for the 
Homeless and NICVA, support providers and HAs (p.34).
Interviews with key stakeholders in 2011 highlighted some of the policy drivers and tensions that were 
impacting on organisations in the homelessness sector. Of fundamental importance was the extent to
which TSO roles and relationships are externally prescribed leading to hybrid forms of identity.
Three of the key parameters are set by the relationships with the state. First, prior to admission to schemes
all clients of supported housing must be registered on the NIHE Common Waiting List and assessed as 
homeless and in priority need by the NIHE. Second, the scope of services funded by SP is set out in grant 
funding agreements. The quality standards of schemes are closely monitored through the regulator QAF
self-assessment and inspection process and one off exercises such as the recent strategic review of 
supported accommodation schemes for homeless people. Third, the funding of homeless support schemes 
is highly dependent on the eligibility of residents (most of whom are out of work) to housing benefit (HB),
and to the availability of top up funding for services over and above those that are eligible for HB funding. 
Welfare Reforms, including restrictions in eligibility for single young people and local limits to HB payments,
were seen as one of the most significant threats to the viability of homelessness support projects in the
future, and some interviewees reported the existence of a funding gap within the modelling of income and
expenditure streams for new homelessness schemes.
4.1.2. Health and Social Care: Mental Health
The growing dominance of community care related expenditure in the SP programme reflects the long-
standing policy priority within Health and Social Care in Northern Ireland of closing long-stay hospitals. This 
policy was given a powerful further endorsement as a result of a fundamental review of mental health and
learning disability services which reported in 2007 (DHSSPS, 2007).8 The strategic direction for mental 
health policy was set in 2005 when the review team set out its vision for the development of services over 
the next 20 years (DHSSPS, 2005). The review argued for services that supported an ordinary life and
recommended the closure of the remaining long-stay hospital wards. The service model adopted depended 
on the continuation of the SP programme or an equivalent replacement. It was based on specialist providers 
operating in HA property drawing down both social care and SP funds to provide the levels of service 
deemed necessary to sustain people with chronic mental health problems for the long term. Thus unlike the 
homelessness schemes which provide mainly temporary accommodation, these social care schemes in
practice provide ͚homes for life͛, as was evident from our visit to a mental health re-provisioning scheme 
(see below). Funds would transfer from hospitals and from nursing and residential homes to support the 
care cost component of new services with housing costs met from housing benefit. Furthermore, staffing
and admissions and discharges from these schemes would be largely in the control of clinicians rather than
the SP administration. 
8 
The review was subsequently named the Bamford Review in recognition of its Chair, Professor David Bamford, who
died before the work was completed.
24
 
  
 
   
 
  
  
    
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
    
 
 
  
  
    
 
   
   
  
 
                                                          
   
 
Third sector housing partnerships
The recommendations of the Bamford Review were adopted in their entirety by the incoming Northern
Ireland administration in 2007 and the core role for housing was recognised in the 2010 spending review 
where, an additional £16.4 million was found for both capital and revenue in the SP budget to implement 
the policy to close the remaining hospital wards. Although a joint bid was submitted by the Departments for 
Social Development (DSD) and Health, Personal Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS, 2007), the £23m
needed to pay for additional care support required by the people moving from hospitals was not ring-
fenced and in the first year of the spending review period it proved very difficult to get new schemes 
established.  In the financial year 2011–2012, some unspent SP capital money was handed over to the 
DHSSPS by the DSD because of problems in identifying downstream revenue funding for social care 
(stakeholder interview, May 2012). By making these transfers it was possible to proceed with some of the
capital funded schemes that had been provided for in the housing programme but which could not proceed 
without revenue support. 
Problems of aligning the SP and the social care budgets have given rise to concerns that in some cases the 
viability of schemes can turn on the availability of sums to meet the social care costs of residents. Loans 
taken out by HAs to build schemes puts pressure on scheme providers to find tenants while at the same 
time the supply of potential tenants depends on budgetary decisions made by Health and Social Care Trusts
and associated assessment decisions which while ratified by the NIHE team are in practice made by health 
and social care professionals. In effect there has been a worry that the implementation of housing policy
was being driven by Health policy priorities and budgetary constraints (Stakeholder interview, May 2012).  
In addition, difficulties have arisen in deciding the dividing line between the two kinds of support, 
particularly when in practice the two kinds of support are provided by the same people, whose salary costs 
are met from pooled resources from the two funding streams. An increasingly important source of influence
in how the schemes are managed is the Social Care Inspectorate, the Regulation and Quality Improvement 
Authority, which adds a separate regulatory framework with the power to re-designate schemes and in 
extreme cases close them down.9 Thus SP providers face double regulation from both the RQIA and the SP
QAF framework. Problems in aligning budgets, overlap in housing support and social care functions and a
duplication of regulatory oversight has led some within the DSD to argue that it would be better to move 
the whole of that part of the SP budget used by Bamford review related schemes to the DHSSPS (DSD NI
2011b). Interestingly, this has been echoed by some of the support provider organisations on the grounds 
that it would simplify their external relations with funders and reduce the regulatory burden (Interview, 
May, 2012). 
4.2. Case Studies  
This section introduces the two SP case study projects. Subsequent sections then review the evidence 
collected from visits to and discussions with the two SP case study projects on: 
 Drivers of partnerships
  
 Processes within partnerships
  
 Outcomes and key learning from partnerships
  
4.2.1. 4.2.1 The Homelessness project 
The homeless support provider in the case study exhibited a strong sense of its social mission and historic 
roots in civil society. This organisation had evolved organically out of a more generalist congregation based 
religious voluntary organization. It had become a specialist, highly professionalised and social 
entrepreneurial organisation through a complex process of geographical spread and growth.  An important 
feature is its commitment to work with the most vulnerable, and those who no one else will.   
9 
One scheme closed earlier in 2012 as a result of a RQIA closure order leading to the withdrawal of the 
provider from Northern Ireland altogether.
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We͛ve a very strong commitment to working with //// .the poorest of the poor, so people who may be... even 
though they͛re homeless providers would struggle to work with at times ;EO Interview, May 2012Ϳ/
Project visits confirmed that this social ethos and ͚low threshold͛ approach10 did indeed resonate through
the organisation, including front line delivery staff that used the term in discussions. The underlying
approach was explained by the project manager:
We take a very gentle approach – if we are going to have successful relationships with people here they
cannot live day to day with the feeling that they could be thrown out of here for something that in the
grand scheme of things is quite petty. Hostels that throw people out simply disenfranchise them a bit more 
(local project manager interview August 2012).
Its experience and skills in working with the most challenging service users had led to it being invited into
Northern Ireland in the first place in 2005. Coupled with a high reputation for effective management, this 
niche has given it a degree of protection from potential competitors. However, the potentially higher costs 
of working with such groups have been only partially recognised by the SP and related HB funding regimes. 
Here the organisation͛s ability to bring further resources into play through fund raising, volunteering and
efficient business practices was seen as increasingly important.  But as discussed below the relationship
between this ability and contribution and the public funding environment for core services was seen as 
deeply problematic. 
These issues were particularly apparent in the individual scheme visited as part of the case study which
caters for a different client group to the organisation͛s elfast project/ For this scheme the main target
group is for single people and childless couples. The scheme opened in 2009 in a market town outside 
Belfast where homelessness and a lack of associated suitable accommodation had been recognised by the 
NIHE.  A 23 bed scheme of managed flats in a new block in the town centre, 15 places are reserved for 
referral from the homelessness register kept by the local NIHE office with the remainder available for 
referral from other agencies and on occasion self-referral. The NIHE must nevertheless accept all residents 
as homeless. Viewed from the outset as a high risk venture due to lack of clarity in demand, potential 
hostility from local residents and an untried service model in that setting, the risks were managed in the 
context of the establishment of the partnership between the provider, the HA and the local NIHE office
before the scheme was commissioned. The longstanding business relationship between the provider and
HA, shared across all the providers͛ schemes in Northern Ireland, has been particularly important in risk
management.
4.2.2. The Mental Health Scheme
The mental health support provider in our case study is a long-established charity in the field with a history 
of providing day care and other services from a volunteer base going back to the early 1960s. The
development of outsourcing of mental health services from the early 1990s onwards provided the context 
for rapid growth and professionalisation of the organisation. It now manages a wide range of supported
housing, group living schemes and floating support funded through SP, a number of day care projects, and
an advocacy service as well as a workplace counselling service and a substantial research arm. It is widely
recognised for its professional expertise and it has excellent working relations with health and social care 
boards and hospitals, which are further eased by staff transfers and recruitment from these bodies.
The particular scheme visited as part of our case study was a new housing development of 22 units
designed to provide supported living for people who had been long-stay hospital patients – some for over 
30 years. Some residents came straight from hospital while others had previously lived in a group home run
by hospital staff on a nearby site on the edge of the hospital grounds that had been closed and re-
provisioned by the case study partnership.
10 
The organisation uses this term to characterise its willingness to work with the most chaotic users and to 
avoid evicting them at all costs – the text quote highlights the mission driven rationale for this practice.
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Third sector housing partnerships
Built on land next to the hospital site, now laid out as a suburban streetscape of mainly single storey houses
(with two small maisonette blocks) in a cul-de-sac, it was regarded by the support provider and the HA as a
model project. There was strong support from senior to operational management for working with a HA 
partner as landlord as the preferred model of service delivery. As part of the hospital decanting process, the 
Health and Social Care Trust and the NIHE had recruited both the support provider and the HA partner to
develop the scheme very early in the planning process as a result of a strategic search for partner providers. 
The absence of competitive procurement had provided the space for developing the necessary trust and
sense of involvement in the design and delivery of the scheme that both the provider and the HA viewed as
the foundation of the scheme͛s perceived success. 
4.3.Drivers
Aside from resource constraints, the key policy drivers are:
The Supporting People strategy, 2012-15.  Publication of this had been delayed at the time of our
research pending a DSD review of commissioning, but the consultation on the draft has now been 
completed. The proposed focus on efficiency and value for money and on greater user participation
among other highlighted issues are likely to have a direct impact on service delivery partnerships. 
The Homelessness Strategy: a new homelessness strategy was published at the time of our 
research. This imposes an important operational constraint on hostels in that projects with SP
funding have to fit within the strategy͛s two year move on policy for residents/ 
The Bamford Review.  The only area of growth in the SP programme, given otherwise frozen 
budgets, it is nevertheless subject to budgetary problems within Health and Social Care. In schemes 
where residents have care packages, the Health and Social Care Trusts effectively control access and
hence viability of schemes while very often contributing the least funding.
The review of Health and Social Care in Northern Ireland: Transforming your Care: Issued by the
DHSSPS for consultation in October 2012, it is now in the early stages of implementation. Its focus 
on user-led services based at service users͛ homes, endorses the approach adopted in the amford
Review. Unlike the issue of hospital re-provisioning the potential impact of service re-alignments on
the SP budget remain unclear, but it is feasible that it will impact on demands for ͚floating support͛ 
for people with chronic mental health problems living at home. 
In both cases we found public policy drivers to be dominant in structuring the partnerships, although there
were clear differences between the two policy fields – homelessness and mental health. Vertical policies 
developed within these service delivery silos (homelessness and health and social care) were found to be 
much more important than horizontal policy drivers such as the Voluntary and Community Sector 
Concordat in regulating state/voluntary and community sector relations.
In the homelessness case there were conflicting expectations and inputs of NIHE regional office and
contract agreements with SP team. These public sector drivers set the conditions for the intake and
discharge of clients, the need to meet a quota of 15 NIHE homeless referrals for the 22 flats and the need to
discharge clients within 2 years.
In the mental health case there was an even higher level of dependence on relations with the public sector
health authorities/ !lthough badged as ͚care in the community͛, the location of the scheme within the 
boundary of the old hospital site and effectively isolated from surrounding residential and community
facilities symbolised the organisational location of the scheme within the health service. It was entirely
dependent on clinical decisions for intake and discharge, it was mainly staffed by former health sector 
personnel and it was highly regulated by the RQIA. 
Partnerships are also driven by competing logics deriving from the commercial basis of HA finance and the 
strong and weak third sector logics of support providers and HAs: HAs now borrow the majority of the funds 
required to construct new housing, and must finance maintenance and major repairs from accumulated 
rental income surpluses. While levels of grant are higher for special needs schemes, the business model 
and organisational logics of HAs are now strongly driven by the imperative to repay private loans. This driver
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places pressure on contractual agreements with support partners to maintain high levels of occupancy and
rental income collection and limits the scale of maintenance and improvements that can be provided in
return. This pressure is further reinforced by the terms of SP funding.
Support providers, and to a lesser extent HA partners also have third sector identities and ethos which place
competing drivers on the way in which services are provided and can enable additional resources to be 
harnessed from volunteering, charitable donations and corporate social responsibility. The social purpose 
and mission statements of these organisations are usually clearly enunciated to position these organisations 
as distinct from either state of market providers. In some cases these distinct third sector values are 
enacted within the organisational cultures and day to day routines and practices of these organisations, as
powerful competing institutional logics.
There is substantial pressure on support providers to prop up the operation of schemes through using
charitable income to make up any deficits, or to raise service quality beyond the level sustainable through
public funding streams. However, providers are reluctant to use their capability to attract charitable funding
and volunteering to provide public services below cost/ Instead they use these ͚third sector resources͛ to
provide extras such as the gym funded from CSR from a major construction firm (pictured on the cover of 
this report), and additional non-core projects provided in the homelessness case study.
Further resources that can potentially be mobilised by third sector providers are based on the relationships 
forged with service users. While none of the case studies here involved cooperative forms of organisation in
which users actually run or govern support providers, there were examples of co-production of services
with users. These benefits of third sector provision are exemplified by the mosaic produced by residents in
the mental health supported scheme also depicted on the report cover. 
4.4.Structures
The structure of the SP partnerships was much simpler than the PGs. These are essentially one to one 
partnerships between support providers and HAs based on a single scheme. The core relationship in these 
schemes is between the support provider and its HA partner. In both case studies, although these were new 
schemes, this relationship was long-standing at an inter-agency level and was able to draw on trust 
developed over the years.
Some support providers have developed multiple schemes with the same HA partner, others have multiple
HA partners. 
Prospective partners have historically had a lot of say on whom they work with. Partnerships are created 
through trust-based negotiation led by the commissioners who choose appropriate providers and HA
partners on the basis of track record and the prior requirement to meet qualifying standards in governance 
and management competence. 
The basis of these structures was the SP grant allocation by NIHE and associated partnership agreements 
setting out the responsibilities of the partners. SP Partnerships are regulated by a joint management 
agreement (sometimes a service level agreement) specifying the relationship between the partners and
specifying responsibilities for occupancy levels, rent collection and service quality. 
External regulation also affects these structures. In addition to meeting the requirements of grant, support
providers are subject to the QAF audit framework to ensure adequate standards of service are provided to
service users.
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4.5.Processes
In both cases, the partnership was established at the initial planning stage once a decision had been taken
to commission the scheme. Interview evidence from provider staff closely involved in establishing the
schemes showed how these relationships helped resolve problems over design and delivery as they were 
developed. This stability flowed from two key features of the SP programme: the strict division between
commissioning and delivery; and participation by support providers as a result of an invitation by
commissioners rather than through procurement.
Periodic meetings are held at a variety of levels within the partners and commissioner to manage these 
contracts and account for Supporting People grant. 
QAF inspections are held by NIHE to regulate the quality of service provided to users. Social care providers
are also regulated by the Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority (RQIA) and the support providers
visited also had rigorous internal audit systems.
In cases where scheme residents are placed through care management run by Health and Social Care Trusts,
this can ameliorate tensions where there is adequate social care funding, but can be a block, where funding
is tight.
The use of intelligent commissioning rather than public procurement has aided the development of longer
term relationships. But the continued treatment of SP payments as grants rather than fees imposes financial
constraints on providers, and conditions which prevent the recycling of savings or the virement of funds 
between years prevents support providers from ͚trading͛ as social enterprises/
4.5.1. Homelessness
The relationship was considerably more fraught in the case of the homelessness scheme than it was for the
equivalent relationship in the mental health scheme.  There was clear clash of principles between on the 
one hand the providers͛ ethical commitment of service to people others might turn away and the H!
partners͛ more commercially driven business practice/ For the support provider the financial model for the
scheme appeared very risky. 
͞This will particularly impact on (name of scheme), which is moving towards deficit.  There has always been
an issue over the difference between the income received through housing benefit and the rent charged. This 
gap now runs at about £21 a week, negotiated down as the financial model envisaged when the scheme
opened was not sustainable0/ The initial starting point was rent of £140/  !nd housing benefit were coming
back to us with the market rate of £70.  So we were, like, em, hello?! 

The risk is getting wider because as housing benefit is being increasingly capped or even reduced or
 
reviewed, the H! is still increasing their rent and we are not recovering that, ultimately/  !nd we͛re suffering
some wider deficits and our conversations we have ;with H! partnerͿ are really around this where we͛ve
gone, oh, you can͛t justify a 5% increase, or can you justify a 5% increase?͟ (Interview CEO and Finance 
Director, May, 2012)
The HA view was stated as follows:
͞Our charges are set on what we need to make the scheme viable. We should not be cross-subsidising the 
support partner by depressing our charges///don͛t worry about our charges we͛ll drop it by 5% because you
are not receiving the necessary uplift from the commissioners/ It shouldn͛t work like that/ We try to be 
sensitive on these issues but we͛ve a very tight dynamic, on the loan we are price sensitive and we also know
that our partners may be looking to have major works done/͟ ;Interview H! manager, !ugust, 2012).
In negotiations, the support provider is in a weaker position than its HA partner. In part this is a function of 
relative size. HAs are generally much the larger of the two organisations, with substantial assets in terms of 
the property owned and where any particular scheme is a much smaller part of the whole operation with a 
corresponding relative reduction in risk exposure. In the case study, the provider managed five schemes 
across Northern Ireland while its HA partner had between 300 and 350 units with 15 different partner 
29
 
  
 
 
   
  
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
   
   
 
 
 
  
  
    
      
 
  
   
  
  
 
 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
   
 
 
 
 
   
Third sector housing partnerships
organisations in the SP programme, themselves forming a relatively small part of a total housing stock of 
over 5,500 units.  This is compounded by the joint management agreements governing relationships. The 
case study was typical in this respect/  Here the provider was responsible for collecting residents͛ housing
benefit and managing voids. Rent remained payable on empty units where there would be no
corresponding housing benefit to cover it.  
The ability of providers to manage financial risk, has in the view of the case study provider, been made more 
difficult by the release of new guidance from the DSD in the summer of 2012 specifically forbidding the use
of SP grants to build reserves and requiring clawback of unspent money at the end of each financial year. 
The change reflected a strict interpretation of the grant basis of the funding relationship where the funds 
were viewed as a payment for a particular level of service within a particular financial year. Surpluses are 
thus treated as over-payments to be returned. This makes it impossible for providers to use any annual 
surpluses to cover potential deficits in following years; and thereby explicitly conflicts with the trading
model associated with social enterprises (or indeed profit distributing market providers) providing public 
services.  The response in this case had been two fold. First, there had been a concerted effort to build an 
alliance of support providers in the SP programme to point out how destabilising for the sector as a whole
these changes were. But, as a fallback the case study organisation had also sought to hedge its risk by the 
following measure:
͞Second, we have written in a 3 to 6 month notice period rather than the 12 months before [the contact can
be terminated by either party]. We are both voluntary organisations, but this is a business relationship at its
core, and our organisation shouldn͛t be disadvantaged by the other/ That͛s the key for me/ If we can͛t build
reserves we can͛t allow H!s to build reserves on the back of our inability to do so/͟ (Interview, CEO, August, 
2012)
In protecting itself in this way, the provider was indicating that it would be willing to exercise its power of 
exit if it judged the financial risk as being too high.  The HA partner was sensitive to the implications as it 
had experience of a scheme failure with another support partner who had experienced major financial
difficulties. The HA had been faced with having to step in at short notice to directly manage a scheme. 
While it had no wish to do this, it had a duty of care to vulnerable licensees and a legal responsibility to
maintain the service by stepping in and then finding a substitute provider.  Its response has been to improve
communication and tighten the procedures governing relationships, and to require more detailed financial
monitoring information from all of its 15 different partner organisations. The interviewee from the HA was 
clear that the case study partner was sound in this respect with no such difficulties anticipated.
The case study relationship was aided by the fact that the HA partner had no interest in directly managing
such specialist services and consequently there were no competitive pressures on the trust required to
permit the sharing of potentially commercially sensitive information.  Nevertheless, the scheme had been 
designed with the potential of conversion to general housing use if necessary.  From the point of view of the
HA this was a matter of prudent management of its assets with a view to ensuring it would continue to earn
revenue through rents needed to service the bank loan if ever the homelessness scheme were to fail. For 
the provider on the other hand, the possibility that its HA partner could walk away added to the pressure to
ensure that rents were paid. 
The overall relationship was seen as generally very good on both sides. This was partly a result of the highly 
specialised, and therefore non-substitutable, role taken on by the support partners discussed above.  It was 
also partly a result of the high quality design of the building and the good maintenance arrangements by the
contractor in the initial period of occupancy. However, there had been emerging problems with the high
specification features of the building such as sensors on back door and bathrooms, which cut out power and
water supply, and call out arrangements were less responsive after year 1 when a new contractor was 
appointed. On a day-to-day basis, relations were affected by ongoing maintenance issues of this kind.  
Pressure on the provider to dip into charitable income to short-circuit problems, a route it was reluctant to
go down, is likely to increase as in a move to control costs, the HA has reduced its maintenance cycle from
every three years to every six years. 
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Third sector housing partnerships
Turning now to consider processes involved in negotiating the strong public sector drivers outlined earlier, 
the homelessness case highlights the impact of conflicting expectations and inputs of NIHE regional office 
and contract agreements with SP. While the contract specified that the majority of clients had to be 
referred by the NIHE regional office and had to have ͚Full Duty !pplicant (FD!) status (meaning full duty to
assist under the Homelessness legislation), in practice the regional office was often unable to make
sufficient referrals with this status to fill vacancies. The project was able to adapt its response by
assembling its own waiting list of referrals of high needs clients (from partner agencies such as Probation
Service, 16+team, mental health team) and to secure homelessness assessments subsequently. 
͞We would tend to have a waiting list of 20, 30 plus people on any given day͛͟/
In this way the balance between contract and intake dependencies on NIHE regional office are managed.
The scheme is similarly affected by the interaction between the maximum stay of 2 years for residents 
specified in the contract and dependencies on NIHE and HAs for most move on accommodation. This again
needed careful relationship management with the statutory partner, the use of outcome-related star 
assessments to demonstrate that residents have acquired the skills necessary to live independently. 
Needless to say these dependencies can be affected by personalities and individual relationships.
͞We start from different world views. They are concerned with points and numbers and we are concerned
with the whole person. But much can be achieved through good relationships. We are very hopeful of the 
new area manager͟ (Local staff member interview August 2012).
4.5.2. Mental Health
The evidence from the interviews at all levels with the mental health support provider suggests that for 
them, the relationship with the HA partner loomed less large as an issue. As with the homelessness 
partnership case study, the relationship was an old one and had not had to be constructed anew for this 
particular scheme at the time it was commissioned. The relationship was seen as very good, partly as a
result of close joint work with the HA, the provider and the Health and Social Care Trust, the architects and
builders.  The hospital patients, who had been identified as potential residents, had been closely consulted
on design features from the start. 
As with the homelessness project discussed, the underpinning structure of the Supporting People
programme helped provide the backdrop for this success, notably the reliance on previous relationship for 
commissioning decisions. Talking more generally about all its SP schemes, a senior manager of the provider 
explained how partnerships were created:
͞No and it͛s very mixed/ Obviously if we͛re the provider of the service within a scheme that͛s being replaced
or expanded we͛d be the preferred provider for consistency. At other times (Health and Social Care) Trusts
would identify a preferred provider to work in partnership with and then the NIHE would identify the HA to
work with.  And sometimes they make those decisions on relationships that are already established and are
good working relationships0 It would mostly be the Trust and the NIHE would be more involved in 
identifying the HA bit of it.  The Trust would be identifying a preferred provider service.͟ ;Senior Manager, SP
provider).
Turning to consider the impact of public sector drivers it is clear that control over who lives in the scheme
effectively remains entirely with the Health and Social Care Trust. Places are only available to people who
have previously been long-stay hospital patients and they are identified through a care planning and care 
management process that is professionally and administratively led by the Trust. Only after they are 
selected are they then placed on the housing waiting list so as they can qualify for housing benefit. Also it 
was apparent that people were only referred to the scheme when there was sufficient funding for the care 
package. 
The support provider is in effect embedded in this public sector professional/administrative process as the 
implementer of care planning decisions that are ultimately the responsibility of a consultant psychiatrist in
the hospital. 
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Third sector housing partnerships
͞Nobody in this scheme would be here without a care manager; a care manager and a care package, and a 
hospital discharge plan; all those kind of things. So it's clearly within that context the scheme is offering
support...͟ (Scheme manager, interview August, 2012)
!lthough formally and legally licensees of the H!, residents͛ continuing occupancy is in practice subject to
case management review and psychiatric assessment. In principle it is open to them to move to
environments with less intensive support, but they can also be returned to hospital or, if their nursing care
needs are too high, to a nursing home. 
This has important implications for relations with the HA partner.  Whilst the joint management agreement 
makes the provider formally responsible for the rent, the risks associated with the management of voids, so
important in homelessness services, are hard to detect in this case where there is a waiting list for a place 
for people still in the feeder hospital. There was no mention of any financial shortfall between the rent 
charged and the housing benefit received for each resident, possibly because payment rates were higher
and more closely aligned with rents and because high level care costs were funded directly by the Health 
and Social Care Trust on top of the SP Grant. In the homelessness case the gap had been so wide because 
housing benefit rates were set at much lower rent levels due to its location outside Belfast and because only 
SP grant was available to meet the support costs. 
In our interviews in the mental health case, any problems over rent levels and housing benefit payable were 
seen as manageable:
͞There are sometimes some tensions around rent and SP and rents going up and things, but usually those
difficulties are dealt with within partnership meetings and the relationship is generally good between myself
and my senior staff and the senior staff within the HAs.͟ (Senior manager, interview, May 2012)
These factors served to reduce the commercial pressures on the provider in the short term, but were a 
consequence of it being embedded in the hospital͛s care planning and management processes and thereby
much more exposed to public sector than to commercial drivers. 
Turning to consider the impact of third sector drivers we can see how this public sector dominance fitted 
the value-base of the provider organisation. It had sought to combine its charitable origins and continuing
charitable objects with professional practice based on sound evidence, aligning it closely with the values 
that inform professional psychiatry. The ability of the organisation to express its charitable objectives in this
professional form reduced the potential tension between the organisation͛s charitable roots and objectives
and the formal medically driven context within which this scheme operated. This relationship underpinned 
the scheme͛s success, symbolised perhaps by the personal journey of the scheme͛s manager which had
mirrored that of the residents as he had moved from a role within the hospital to managing a group home 
facility run by the hospital outside its grounds to managing the current scheme. 
However, the rather close and symbiotic relationship between the provider and the Health and Social Care
Trust and the relatively trouble free relationship with the HA partner is not necessarily typical of such
schemes. In a scoping interview conducted for this study with another smaller mental health support 
provider in 2011, relations with both its HA and the health and social care trusts partners were much
spikier.  In this case the HA was seen as a potential competitor for the service contracts, making commercial 
confidentiality a much more important issue in the conduct of relations and trust much more difficult to
maintain.  
͞We͛ve recently, for example, renegotiated our service level agreement with the HA and the very first
meeting was really quite an angry affair and quite difficult, because we were coming at things from very 
different positions and we really did feel that the HA, which by the way also had a care provision wing, was 
potentially trying to nudge us out.  So that its own care provider within its own organisation could take over
our schemes, given that they owned the housing.  All they needed to do was nudge us out and take over the 
care.  And at the very first meeting I made no bones about saying that, and saying ͞Look, why should I trust
you in this discussion?͟, because that͛s where this could lead to, and ͞If you wipe out our seven housing
schemes that decimates this charity/͟ (Senior Manager, Mental Health Provider, Interview 2011)
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Third sector housing partnerships
Similarly commercial concerns seemed to play a larger role for this less professionally embedded 
organisation in its relations with the health and social care trusts. These relations were perceived to be 
much more concerned with matters such as costs and less appreciative of the particular contribution of this 
support provider rather than other potential providers.  Whereas, our main case study scheme which had
been set up over a number of years in consultation with a group of patients who were identified by the
Trust as the future tenants also meant that funding had not been an issue. In contrast with this experience
the scoping interviewee from 2011 had a very different perspective, noting that a particular problem was
the way that the Trusts controlled access to the schemes, but put least money on the table (compared with 
SP grant and housing benefit inputs):
͞But then in the wings you͛ve got the Health and Social are Trust, who are usually the ones providing the
tenants on hospital discharge.  And while the Health and Social Care Trust sees itself as the kingpin in terms 
of who goes where, they͛re the ones putting nothing on the table in terms of the finance/ !nd in fact it͛s in
their interest to have patients discharged from hospital, but once they͛re discharged form hospital SP pick up
the bulk of the cost, the housing association provides the accommodation, we provide the care and the care 
element tends to be funded by the trust to us/ ut that͛s the smallest element͟ (Senior Manager, Mental 
Health Provider, Interview 2011).
In his experience, the Trusts he dealt with were always trying to squeeze price and had no long-term
commitment to his agency.
This indicates that there may be an important third sector driver arising from intangible assets held by the 
support providers themselves, for example reputation and track record, or degree of mission alignment 
with operational values governing the policy field in which specific schemes operated, as well as the more
tangible assets such as relative size and ability to prepare and deliver large scale tenders.
4.6.Outcomes and Key Learning
The evidence summarised here suggests a number of learning points. Given that SP partnerships have been
remarkably stable but have had their ͞ups and downs, often involving money͟, it has been suggested that a 
positive initiative might be taken to share learning on the financial models that underpin the contributions
of the two sets of partners to learn more about the factors that inhibit effective collaboration.
Partnerships between HAs and support providers work best where there is an absence of competition,
either between the partner agencies themselves or in the commissioning process.
Commissioning through selection and agreement, although less transparent than procurement, supports
the development of longer term trust-based relationships that have proved particularly valuable for 
managing the process of establishing new schemes.
The almost complete absence of formal user involvement in the partnerships, except in the consumer 
advisory role of the kind adopted in the mental health case study, is not atypical of third sector partnerships 
in NI. In one case study this absence had been an issue in the QAF regulatory process. There is a need to
examine whether enhanced formal user engagement might help or hinder smooth running of inter-agency
partnerships. 
The financial environment involves high risks for the partner agencies and the tension between, on the one 
hand, the commercial loans underpinning the financing of the buildings that schemes are based in and, on
the other, the role of housing benefit in paying the rents needed to support the loans dominates the 
operation of the partnerships. This is a more direct issue in homelessness schemes where housing benefit
limits are a potentially crucial constraint in the absence of revenue funding that reflects the actual costs of 
service provision. 
In schemes where residents are placed by Health and Social Care Trusts, because of the policy priority of 
closing long stay hospitals, there is a ready availability of potential residents. This displaces the problem to
blockages in Health and Social Care funding. However, as suggested in section 6.5.1 on future scenarios, the 
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Third sector housing partnerships
continued freezing of SP budgets and impending changes to housing benefit, risks destabilizing the entire
programme in the medium term.   
5. Social Housing Procurement Groups
5.1.Policy background and Influences
Most of Northern Ireland͛s H!s were established in the mid-1970s. Following the pattern in the rest of the 
United Kingdom, further growth occurred under the ͚mixed funding͛ regime from 1992 and then from 1996
when the new build programme was transferred to HAs (Mullins et al, 2001). Although the NIHE remains
the largest social landlord, the proportion of HA stock continues to grow through the combination of the 
new build programme and reductions in NIHE stock as a result of house sales to tenants. Currently, the NIHE
manages around 89,000 properties, with a further 29,200 homes and 4,500 non self-contained units 
managed by 25 HAs. The ten largest HAs own 78 per cent of all HA stock (NIHE, 2012). The history of 
Northern Ireland͛s H! movement is of small to medium-sized social landlords with distinct identities and
connections to local communities. This may be one reason why mergers and group structures are only 
slowly beginning to reduce the number of associations despite Government pressure to do so from 2008
onwards.
Housing policy is one of a wide range of functions devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive, 
which although established in 1999 only completed its first full term of office between 2007 – 2011. 
Devolution has led to a greater degree of housing policy ownership by politicians, in a policy field previously
dominated by a technocratic approach (Muir, 2012). In addition to PGs, a number of other issues have had
to be addressed by HAs since 2007, including:
The first round of a revised regulatory system which had resulted in the overall performance of 14
out of 33 associations being categorised as ͚unacceptable͛ and the development performance of 10
out of 28 developing associations as ͚unacceptable͛ (NI!O, 2009)- with seven H! subsequently 
suspended from development;
 
Pressure to use accumulated reserves to subsidise new development (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 

2010);
 
The move towards bond finance (as part of greater reliance on private finance generally) which
 
requires larger organisations, consortia or groups11;
 
The introduction of a nine-year limit on HA Board membership;
 
Continuing identified need for new social housing, currently calculated at 2,000 units per year 

(NIHE, 2012) although the social housing output target is 6,500 over four years (NIE, 2015);
 
Falling public subsidy as a share of total costs of new build;

The planned restructuring of the NIHE creating uncertainty about the future structure of social
 
housing provision;

Welfare Reform including the ͚bedroom tax͛ for social housing tenants and the introduction of 
Universal Credit (on the assumption that the NI Executive retains its parity agreement with the UK 
Treasury)- benefit shortfalls on the social housing rent of ͞under-occupiers͟ may make H!s a less 
attractive option for lenders of private finance. 
The draft Housing Strategy for 2012-17 also proposes lower grant rates and quality standards for social
housing along with higher rents and exploration of ͚innovative models͛ for additional funding and the 
possibility of allowing 'for profit͛ private sector developers to access grant funding (DSD, 2012a)/ !ll points
to a challenging combination of less secure rental income and a lower rate of subsidy for new social housing
11 
Personal communication with CEO of NIFHA, June 2013
34
 
  
 
  
                                                          
Third sector housing partnerships
over the next few years, in which associations will have to consider their attitude to risk in relation to asset 
management and which may lead some associations to consider new organisational arrangements. 
The restructuring of the HA sector since the introduction of the DSD Procurement Strategy (DSD, 2008) has 
been sensitive and contested. HAs maintain that, as independent entities, they cannot be forced into new 
arrangements. Government officials stress that they are not trying to do this and that any new 
organisational arrangements in the sector are a matter for associations themselves. The Procurement 
Strategy emphasises the need for associations to become more efficient and to comply with EU public 
procurement rules, however there is no specific reference to reducing the number of associations or to any 
other organisational changes except PGs themselves (such as mergers or group structures). Explicit mention 
of reducing numbers of HAs as an efficiency driver have tended to come from Ministers of Social 
Development rather than the Procurement Strategy12. The draft Housing Strategy is also clear about the 
likely direction of change, with its emphasis on restructuring through reducing numbers of associations 
rather than through consortia arrangements such as PGs:  
͞We believe there are clear opportunities to create a more efficient and effective housing association 
sector. This may require further consolidation within the sector resulting in a smaller number of 
associations͛͟ (DSD, 2012a. 49)/ 
5.1.1. Policy influences 
Prior to the establishment of PGs in 2009, most HAs made individual bids to the Social Housing 
Development Programme (SHDP) and, if successful, invited tenders on a one-off basis. There were a few 
instances of development partnerships between larger and smaller associations, and a ͚preferred partner͛ 
scheme of nine HAs had operated in North Belfast as part of the North Belfast Housing Strategy (NIHE, 
2001). Some small associations also collaborated on maintenance contracts.  
The move from this largely autonomous mode of operation to enforced collaboration was associated with 
European Union (EU) Procurement Directives and also due to the drive for greater efficiency in the UK 
construction sector. Firstly, the relevant EU Directives were enacted as the Public Contracts Regulations 
2006, with amendments in 2009 and 2011. HAs count as public sector bodies for procurement purposes 
under Public Sector Directive 2004/18. Public procurement is a devolved matter but it is implemented in 
close conjunction with other UK jurisdictions under the terms of a 2001 Concordat between the Northern 
Ireland Executive and the UK Government13. However, as explored below, this does not mean that each 
jurisdiction has chosen to approach the procurement of social housing in the same way. In addition, the 
concern for greater efficiency in construction at UK level (Department of Environment, Transport and The 
Regions (DETR), 1998; Strategic Forum for onstruction, 2002) has been reflected in Northern Ireland͛s own 
Achieving Excellence initiative, the principles of which are incorporated into procurement guidance (DFP, 
2012a).  
12 
 For example: http://www.insidehousing.co.uk/tenancies/poor-performing-housing-associations-
pushed-to-merge/6516110.article  reported in June 2011. Last accessed 14th  May 2013. 
13 
 http://www.dfpni.gov.uk/index/procurement-2/cpd/cpd-policy-and-legislation/ni-pp-policy/cpd-
concordat-on-public-procurement.htm Last accessed 6th November 2012. 
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Table 5.1: Outline of social housing procurement process in UK jurisdictions, 2012 
36
 
 Jurisdiction  Programme  Grouping
 required?
 Other comments
England Affordable Homes 
Programme 2011-15; 
  previously National
Affordable Housing 
Programme 2008-11. 
 No, but voluntary
consortia are 
common to enable 
 non- Investment 
Partners to access 
grant.  
Must qualify as Investment Partner 
  with the Homes and Communities
 Agency if wishing to bid. Councils, 
Arms Length Management 
 Organisations (ALMOs) and private 
 sector bodies may also bid for 
 development funding. New
‘affordable renting’ model different 
from rest of UK. Procurement 
Efficiency Initiative for materials/ 
supply chain and other purchases. 
Scotland Affordable Housing 
 Supply Programme 
2012-13 to 2014-15; 
  previously annual
 programmes.
 No, but 7 voluntary
development 
  groups (in 2011)
 plus benchmarking
groups. 
 Councils may also bid for 
development funding. Procurement 
 Reform Bill at consultation stage; 
  Scottish Federation of Housing
   Associations (SFHA) opposing HA
 definition as public bodies and 
seeking legal opinion. 
 Wales Social Housing Grant 
 Programme (annual).
 Yes, 6 development 
consortia, 
mandatory from 
2005. 
  Strong overall procurement policy
 framework with emphasis on social
benefit, acknowledged in McClelland 
   Report (2012). European Social
 Fund (ESF) Convergence 
 Programme funding obtained by
 Value Wales to improve capacity. 
Northern 
Ireland 
 Social Housing
Development 
Programme 2012-13 
to 2014-15 (rolling). 
 Yes, 4 (now 3) 
 PGs, mandatory
from 2009. 
Some mergers and group structures 
taking place. NIAO (2012) report on 
 all public procurement identifies 
potential for more savings. 
An outline of the different approaches to social housing procurement across the UK is set out in Table 5.1, 
to make the point that some leeway exists in the implementation of public procurement policy, with 
Northern Ireland at the prescriptive end of the spectrum. In England, a different approach was taken to 
procurement efficiency when in 2004 the then Housing orporation introduced its ͚Investment Partnering͛ 
policy which reduced the number of directly funded developing associations from 400 to around 70. This led 
other developing associations to join consortia led by ͚Investment Partners͛, with some of these eventually 
being involved in mergers or group structures (Mullins and Craig, 2005; Lupton and Kent-Smith, 2012). At 
the same time profit- distributing private developers became eligible for grant, and a few have since been 
funded. However, there has been no prescription on the structure of social housing providers eligible for 
grant, aside from restricting the number directly receiving grant. Bidders must qualify as Investment 
Partners through showing they have the required financial and technical capacity but they may do so as 
single providers or consortia (Homes and Communities Agency (HCA), 2011)/ In parallel, the H!͛s 
Procurement Efficiency Initiative and the UK-wide organisation Procurement for Housing encourage wider 
purchasing efficiencies.  
In Scotland, an attempt to introduce mandatory PGs was abandoned in 2009 after consultation.  By 2011, 
Scottish HAs had formed seven development groups and several groups for other reasons such as 
performance benchmarking (Turner and Townsend Consulting, 2011). As in England, a small number of local 
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authorities are building again and therefore competing for subsidy. A Procurement Reform Bill has recently
been issued for consultation and has prompted the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations to take legal
advice on whether associations should be treated as public bodies for the purposes of procurement14. 
In Wales, development consortia have been mandatory since 2005 and Welsh HAs self-selected into six 
groups which also have wider procurement functions (Housemark Cymru, 2007). Welsh public procurement
policy places great emphasis on social benefit, and a recent report praised the contribution of social
landlords, for example in the use of social clauses (McClelland, 2012). The procurement policy agency Value 
Wales has recently received funding from the European Social Fund to improve procurement capacity15. As 
in Wales, collaborative arrangements are mandatory in Northern Ireland for bidding to the Social Housing
Development Programme (DSD, 2008) and the structures will be explored later in the paper. The Northern
Ireland Audit Office believes there is more potential for procurement savings across the board (NIAO, 2012). 
5.2.Case Studies 
The Procurement Strategy required HAs to be part of a procurement group if they wished to bid for grant 
funding from the SHDP. Associations were expected to form groups themselves and four were initially
established in early 2009 (the number was included in the Strategy), containing between six and ten
members. One group subsequently disbanded and its members joined another group, leading to the current 
situation of three PGs (Table 5.2). During interviews it transpired that other options had been proposed to
DSD by HAs during consultation on the Procurement Strategy: both a larger number of groups and a single 
entity/ However, DSD͛s view of the process is that they acknowledged and respected the independent third
sector status of HAs by standing back and allowing PGs to form and develop without interference.  
Table 5.2: Procurement group stock summaries 2011-12
Procurement
group
No. of HAs or 
groups
Self-contained
units
Bed spaces Total units
Abacus 11 15402 2540 17942
Accord 5 7734 898 8632
Apex 8 6853 571 7424
Totals 24 29989 4009 33998
Source: (i) Stock: DSD Performance Indicators 2011-12 Table 1: http://www.dsdni.gov.uk/index/hsdiv-
housing/registered_housing_associations/performance_indicators/pi-2011-2012.htm last accessed 19th
 
May 2013. (ii) Procurement group membership information from interviews, August 2012. Notes: (i) Two 

HAs from the DSD table have been omitted as they do not appear to be procurement group members: 

Covenanter and Craigowen.
 
The requirement for PGs was a culture shock to HAs but was endorsed strongly by the then Minister for
Social Development, Margaret Ritchie. The Minister briefed Board members in the early days of the Strategy
and the exclusion of officers from that event was not appreciated, described by one interviewee as leading
to ͚mayhem͛.
14 http://www.sfha.co.uk/sfha/current-consultations/procurement-reform/menu-id-87.html Last 
accessed 6th November 2012.
http://wales.gov.uk/topics/improvingservices/bettervfm/procskills/;jsessionid=79215A8943E0D0676081AF5497D97F 
3D?lang=en Last accessed 6
th 
November 2012.
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Third sector housing partnerships
͞This is a new venture and you͛re trying to be inclusive and build something and you͛re saying ͚by the way, 
we͛re going to meet you but without your officers. Do you think our officers don͛t brief us?//// There was a 
message to come out to us about how wonderful this was and I think it very badly backfired.͟ [Board
member, CSB, 2012]
Board members were kept informed of the process and were supportive of paid staff in setting up the
groups even if they had reservations about the situation. The case study PGs appeared to have formed using
quite similar criteria, the most important being either an existing trust relationship or the potential for trust,
given that most senior staff knew each other and the work of their organisations through policy networks:
͞We invited anyone who was interested to come and play a part... Some came and some left and a balance 
of associations stayed//// You could say a lot of it was relational, ͞an we trust these people?͟ ΀Senior staff,
CSA, 2012]
However, there were still strategic manoeuvres described, including avoidance of some potential partners 
as well as, in one case, a larger association approaching a number of smaller ones in order to position
themselves advantageously for potential mergers. Membership of groups was selected on the basis of
difference rather similarity: they were diverse in terms of size, geographical remit and type of housing
provided:
͞/// we͛re not all of the same size, we͛re not natural competitors with one another..
there is a bit of trust that has been built up...͟ [Senior staff, CSB, 2012]
However, once formed the two case study groups adopted several different features. One chose to
establish itself as a legal entity (preferred in the Procurement Strategy) whereas the other operates through
a partnership agreement, in the spirit of a more voluntary trust based consortium arrangement. One group
involves Board members directly in its governance and the other does not. A third difference is that one 
group has two paid staff and the other uses staff time from its constituent associations. An important 
similarity is that, in both groups, each association has equal voting rights whatever its size. Monitoring is 
carried out by DSD in the form of a mid-term review of the business plan and groups are also expected to
complete the !chieving Excellence ͚maturity grid͛. 
The structure of the case study PGs have changed very little between 2009 and 2012, with the exception of 
the disbanding of the fourth group. In one group there had been two sets of mergers with another under 
discussion; in the other, a group structure was being negotiated between two members. The structure of 
PGs, most crucially the contracts entered into between members, restrict partnerships to group members
and thus have the unintended consequence of limiting the mergers and other partnerships (such as 
maintenance or general purchasing) which policy makers are seeking to encourage. There has been debate 
within each group about the formation of a single development team as encouraged in the Procurement
Strategy, as reported below. 
5.3.Drivers
The policy background and policy influences reviewed above have identified a number of drivers which in 
the Northern Ireland policy context led to this change. Key stakeholders and case study participants both 
identified the crucial influence of EU procurement policy, but efficiency in construction less so:
“I feel the driver really has been European procurement regulations... as they have become more
and more firmed up, more and more definite, and government has insisted that we must adhere
very, very closely to them, that has been the driver over the last five years, that has been the 
significant change.” [Senior staff, CSA, 2012]
Within the social housing policy context, two overlapping but not mutually exclusive elements were 
identified: the requirements to improve performance and to reduce the number of HAs. All participants 
agreed about the importance of high standards of service delivery both in terms of quality of service and
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quantitative outputs, but the perception of case study interviewees was that government saw only one way
to achieve it, through fewer HAs (although DSD participants disagreed with this point). The counter 
argument provided was that smaller and more locally based associations are able to have stronger trust 
based relationships with service users and there can be greater scope to involve these service users in 
improving service standards/ It was suggested by some that there was scope for a ͚best of both worlds
option͛ for larger associations to develop on behalf of smaller ones (through a variety of financial
mechanisms), allowing the small associations to continue to manage stock in local areas where they were
known and trusted. However, this was not supported by some of the smaller associations we spoke to who
felt that local knowledge and involvement was also important in the development process and there were
doubts about the extent of claimed cost reductions.
A key conceptual counter-weight to the notion of ͚economies of scale͛ is that of ͚economies of scope͛ which
may be enjoyed for relationship-oriented activities (exploiting the existence of customer knowledge, team
working, partnership commitment) by providers with strong local and customer-based relationships, who
can provide a wider range of services more cheaply than less trusted providers (Rees et al  2012). This may 
well be the case for the group of small associations we found in the research, who were considering a 
merger within a small area of acute housing need, in order to keep their local base along with a
development function. The suspension from development of Helm HA in March 201116 and the publication
of a critical inspection report into the association the following January (DSD, 2012b) casts further doubt on
the dominant discourse of economies of scale by indicating that size and efficiency did not always go
together, as was acknowledged by some:
͞ you start to ask yourselves the question about development, construction, procurement, expertise, what is
the level of maturity within those groups in terms of delivering the programme? It varies considerably. And
doesn͛t necessarily mean that size is everything either, in that maybe some of the smaller associations/// can
deliver proportionately.͟ [Key stakeholder, 2011]
In addition, once PGs became mandatory, that in itself became a key driver which has changed the nature of 
partnership working in the HA movement.
One clear conclusion of our exploration of drivers of the PGs policy is that it did not emerge from the sector 
itself, even though the sector was considering alternative options such as a single procurement group for 
bulk purchases. Indeed some of our interviewees suggested that little attempt was made to explain or 
discuss the rationale for this particular solution to generate scale economies. This may be seen as a key
weakness in drivers for partnerships which are known to work better where there is trust and ownership by
the actors involved.
5.4.Structures 
Northern Ireland͛s five-year Procurement Strategy for the Social Housing Development Programme (SHDP)
was issued in 2008 and aimed to ͞improve the social, economic and environmental return from investment 
in the SHDP- and procure the programme on a value for money basis and in accordance with best practice͟
(DSD, 2008: 5). A ten per cent efficiency savings target was set. The initial focus was on the procurement 
process for new social housing, however it was intended that the groups would expand their purchasing
functions over time.
Delivery of the Procurement Strategy is the responsibility of the DSD . The Strategy sits within Northern
Ireland͛s overall Public Procurement Policy (DFP, 2012a) which is monitored by the Policy and Performance 
Division of the Central Procurement Directorate (CPD) in the Department of Finance and Personnel (DFP). 
CPD has a team seconded to DSD to advise and assist on the Public Procurement Policy, current guidance
and construction procurement best practice. The Public Procurement Policy included the establishment of 
16 
 http://www.insidehousing.co.uk/helm-housing-association-suspended-from-
development/6514258.article Last accessed 9th November 2012. 
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seven Centres of Procurement Expertise (CoPEs), one of which is the NIHE, which has operational 
responsibility for procurement across the social housing sector. In addition, the Achieving Excellence for 
Northern Ireland initiative for best practice in procurement across all public sector bodies (DFP, 2010) 
operates through assessment via a ͚Maturity Grid͛ of 27 attributes/ PGs were also advised by the Strategic 
Investment Board on the development of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and framework agreements. 
Public procurement policy at government level continues to evolve, for example recent guidance to assist 
social economy organisations (DFP, 2011) and small and medium sized businesses (DFP, 2012b) in tendering
for public contracts.
The Procurement Strategy sets out both implementation and operational structures for the Social Housing
Development Programme (SHDP)/ Detailed guidance for H!s is available in DSD͛s Housing !ssociation Guide 
(Procurement)17. The operational structure is set out in Figure 5.1; the implementation stage was identical 
except that a National Change Agent (NCA) replaced the NIHE. The role of the NCA was regarded as 
prescriptive and generally unhelpful, for example requesting that groups should be established as legal
entities (not adopted by two out the three PGs) and relating to the business plan:
͞It was very clear, I mean, we were basically told, ͞This is what your business plan will look like/  If it doesn͛t
look like it, it won͛t be approved,͟ and we felt that was terribly prescriptive/ We͛re now dealing with, shall
we say, some of the deficiencies of that.͟ [Senior staff, CSA, 2012]
Within the operational structure, DSD is responsible for policy, for guidance to HAs and the regulation and
inspection process for HAs. DSD regulate PGs through the approval of a business plan and its monitoring via
a mid-term review. However, it is notable that procurement group regulation is much lighter than that for
individual HAs. PGs agree scheme priorities for their member associations and present their programme to
the NIHE͛s Development Programme Group (DPG); scheme progress is also monitored by DPG through
meetings with PGs but on an individual basis. Crucially, the responsibility for scheme monitoring has not 
been delegated to PGs. Grant allocations are still made to individual HAs, not to PGs, on the basis that HA
Boards of Management have responsibility for the financial health of the association including private 
finance decisions. There is variation in the extent to which board members are involved in the governance 
of the different PGs and this reflects the lack of guidance on this matter in an otherwise very prescriptive 
framework.
Figure 5.1 summarises the main structural relationships outlined above and locates the Social Housing PGs
within the wider operational structure for delivery of the Procurement Strategy in relation to housing. 
However, it is important to distinguish between the Procurement Strategy itself and the structures 
established within the HA sector to deliver the strategy. As the analysis later in this section illustrates there
is broad agreement on the aims of the procurement strategy but considerable disagreement about whether 
the requirement for developing HAs to join one of the PGs was the best way of implementing the strategy
within the HA sector.
17 http://www.dsdni.gov.uk/index/hsdiv-housing/ha_guide/hagpg-contents.htm Last accessed 10th November 2012.
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Figure 5.1: Operational stage structure for the Procurement Strategy
Source: DSD (2008) p.17. Note: There are now 3 not 4 PGs.
A Programme Board is responsible for the delivery of the Procurement Strategy and it includes 
representatives from the PGs18/ DFP͛s Performance Efficiency Delivery Unit (PEDU), with a service
improvement and efficiency remit in all public services, has recently undertaken a confidential review of the
SHDP.
Therefore the policy and strategic frameworks within which PGs operate are externally imposed and
process-based. The third sector status of HAs and their umbrella body appears to be of little or no relevance
compared with the state driven requirements for public bodies to conform. The construction sector is 
included in the process, but there is no voice for the service users or for the lenders of private finance. 
5.5.Processes
The process of forming and implementing PGs from 2008 – 2012 has had a profound impact on HAs in
Northern Ireland. The findings are set out in three sections: power dynamics and trust; identification of key
and marginal actors; and the place of service users/ tenants in the process. 
5.5.1. Power dynamics and trust
PGs were implemented in a low trust environment in which nearly a third of HAs were suspended from
development, and in which the umbrella trade body, the Northern Ireland Federation of Housing
Associations (NIFHA) was having difficulty in asserting a united third sector identity given the emerging
differences in approach and interests between members. Furthermore the PGs introduced a new layer of
sector governance between individual associations and the umbrella body, leading to new challenges in
maintaining trust and legitimacy. However, a sense of trust was important when choosing procurement 
group partners. It is interesting that no ͚specialist͛ groups formed, for example supported housing providers 
or within a particular geographical area. Rather, groups formed on the basis that they were not direct 
competitors, which seemed to generate more trust, although this clearly introduced a need to understand
the different cultures and priorities among partners with different institutional logics. 
18 
Full membership includes staff from DSD, NIHE, NIFHA, Strategic Investment Board and CPD. The Construction
Employers Federation is co-opted (DSD, 2008: 18).
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It is not possible to state that working in PGs led to a straightforward increase or decrease in trust, or 
indeed to better or worse working relationships overall. The most obvious example is that one group was no
longer able to work together and disbanded. In one case study, working relationships were generally good, 
problems were discussed and an example of this was the sharing of development staff to ensure that
programme targets were met. In the other, there had been a breakdown in the relationship between two of 
the partners which had led to issues not being discussed and disillusion from the lead partner with the 
concept of PGs in general. These contrasting trajectories may have contributed to changes in opinions about 
PGs from our lead contacts between 2011 and 2012 (Table 5.3): the CSA group, initially keen, had become 
disillusioned; and the CSB group had moved from reluctant participation to somewhat greater enthusiasm.
Table 5.3: Changing attitudes towards procurement groups 2011-12
Case study A Case study B
August
2011
We felt it was the best… We didn’t
agree to it just because it was in the
strategy, we felt it was the best
approach and we still think it’s the
best approach
... our mindset is… probably started out one of absolute 
complete resistance and has slowly eroded into a
submission… and into almost now one, to be honest in 
which we’ve got no choice here. This is the future, you 
know, there’s no other show in town.  And if we’re going
to develop in any way in the future that’s the only way
we’re going to develop...
August
2012
Hindsight is a wonderful thing, and
looking back I mean I don’t see
anything that has really come out of
setting up the procurement groups
that has been to our advantage.]
I suppose broadly we feel that we’re starting to reap the 
benefits now, plus we feel – I mean rightly or wrongly, we 
could be knocked down here, but we feel that we can
show the DSD very specific gains now.  
The Procurement Strategy sought to encourage ͚a culture of collaboration͛ (DSD, 2008. 6) and there is some
evidence that this was achieved in Case Study B, albeit once trust was developed after recovering from an
enforced start. This indicates that it is doubtful whether a culture of collaboration can be imposed rather 
than emerging as a result of convergence and formulation of agreed joint goals as part of a learning process, 
as international work on multi-actor decision making suggests (de Bruin and ten Heuvelhof, 2008). 
However, there was also an unintended consequence of restricting partnerships to within the PGs and
therefore ending some earlier organic collaborations. One example from Case Study A had delayed the 
setting up of a contractors͛ framework for maintenance work, because several associations had a previous 
agreement:
͞/// we͛d had it for years... a very European compliant maintenance group. There were four or five housing
associations... It predated the Procurement Strategy but by edict we were told, ͞!ll of your current partners
aren͛t in your procurement group so you can͛t have it/͟ [Senior staff, CSA, 2012]
This was also found in Wales, where the mandatory structure strengthened relationships within
procurement consortia but ͚restricted and closed down other relationships within the housing association
sector as a whole͛ (ard, 2009. 9)/ 
The power dynamics between PGs and DSD, and the trust relationships within each group, were evident in 
the ongoing debate over the formation of a single development team for each group. The Procurement
Strategy refers only to streamlining development activities, but the mid-term review for both case study
groups in 2011 indicated that faster progress towards a single team should be made in the interests of 
efficiency savings. Barriers included potential redundancies across the sector, weakening the power base
and sense of organisational unity and mission within individual associations and difficulties in reaching
agreement on whose standards and procedures should be adopted across PGs. There was a question about 
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whether a single team should be employed by one association or by the procurement group; if the latter, its 
activities would be removed from the governance of Boards of Management who were accountable for
development performance against grant allocation. 
Case study PGs had different attitudes towards the issue. The largest partner in CSA was keen to form a
single development team and had made some progress towards standardising scheme design across the 
group. However, there was opposition from two other members with their own teams and discussion on
the matter within the group had largely ceased. One other partner was unhappy about losing development
skills from his organisation:
Once you take a decision and a decision is taken to use single development teams, I think there͛s very little
opportunity of that coming back again because obviously you have lost sight of that- you͛re not going to
have the capability or ability within your organisation to get that back again. [Senior staff, CSA, 2012]
Arguably this issue had caused significant problems in the working relationships within this group. The 
largest association was disappointed that DSD had not required PGs to adopt single development teams.
This association was now exploring an alternative model (to a single team and also to the conventional 
development partnership) where they would obtain grant and build on behalf of smaller associations, who
would purchase the units on completion.
Case study B had been opposed to a single development team in 2011 but several partners were talking
about an ͚integrated͛ team in 2012/ It is possible that the experience of sharing development staff in the 
interim had prompted the new approach:
͞.. we see that it can grow within the individual organisations... we will do that through the harmonisation of
our procedures, through the joint contracts... because we procured contracts together and we follow exactly 
the same procedures and processes... eventually we might have a planning feasibility team, we might have a
procurement team, we might have an asset management team, and there might be leads within each
organisation and so forth to take that forward... but we would still have the individual association members 
as the investment decision makers͟. [Senior staff, CSB, 2012]
Therefore CSB were developing their own model of collaborative working, shaped by the demands of DSD
but also suited to their own needs, helped they thought by a more flexible approach from DSD. 
To conclude this section, the issue of single development teams was a litmus paper test of the approaches 
adopted by the two case studies. At the time of our second round of fieldwork it appeared that a more 
flexible collaborative approach was proving more successful in effective deployment of development team
resources.
5.5.2. Key and marginal actors in the process
PGs were implemented in a complex policy and practice environment which may be divided into three
parts: overall public procurement policy; the housing policy environment; and practice within the PGs. 
Public procurement policy actors in DFP were influential through their team based in DSD and through
changes to policy and guidance. An example was the issuing of guidance to assist small and medium sized 
firms in tendering for public contracts, in order to ensure that local construction firms were not edged out 
of business by larger companies. 
The !chieving Excellence ͚maturity grid͛ also had its origins in wider procurement policy (DFP, 2010). 
Perhaps most importantly, DFP provided advice on the EU directive that included HAs as public bodies for 
the purposes of public procurement (a decision which is being challenged elsewhere in the UK). There was 
some concern in PGs that procurement policy had restricted opportunities to build supply chain
partnerships as required by Achieving Excellence19: 
19 
DSD have responded as follows: ‘The so-called Design & Build...as operated by associations up to April
2009, were considered to be non-compliant with Procurement Law. This does not prohibit the use of a 
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͞/// the procurement guidance that we have to follow, that doesn͛t often encourage getting into supply
chain, it doesn͛t allow you to build up partnerships, it doesn͛t allow you, you know, to develop those links 
with suppliers/ So fundamentally we͛re saying we can never do what you͛re actually asking us to do because 
if we do it we will breach the procurement guidance..... The procurement [guidance] doesn͛t allow us to do
design and build any more, it doesn͛t allow us to do joint ventures, so our routes for procurement have been 
curtailed by the legislation, if you like, so for us to get value for money I argue that procurement [guidance]
has actually stymied us to do that.͟ [Senior staff, CSB, 2012]
Within the housing policy environment DSD was the most important actor, due to its dual responsibility for
monitoring PGs and regulating HAs. Formal monitoring of PGs had been relatively light touch, with a series 
of Key Performance Indicators taking some time to develop and the results of the case study mid-term
reviews having caused irritation rather than alarm to group members. The ongoing involvement of DSD in 
process issues (assisted by the National Change Agent in the early days) was more indicative of the 
Department͛s importance, however the real impact was made through the regulation of individual H!s/
Both our case study PGs had associations suspended from development and in one case this had had a
substantial impact on programme delivery in a single year. Although one procurement group participant 
had wanted DSD to be more prescriptive (on the issue of the single development team), the general view
was more that the close supervision of associations called into question their independence as third sector 
bodies, which may affect their ability to borrow. 
! stakeholder commented. ͚͟the department...want associations to be I think borrowing much, much more... 
securing much more private finance, but at the same time remaining as in control as ever͟/ (2012). And
indeed, lenders were not involved in any of the policy networks connected with public procurement.
A further important aspect of the influence of DSD, which caused concern in PGs, was the role of successive 
Ministers in pressing for a reduction in the number of HAs, as reflected in the current draft Housing
Strategy. The ongoing discussion of restructuring of the NIHE did not cause as much concern although some 
associations were beginning to think about the potential opportunities for stock transfer and rationalisation
and merger under a new system. The NIHE obviously remained an important part of the decision-making
environment due to its control of the SHDP, including grant allocation, however its role remained the same 
as it had before the establishment of PGs. The final set of relationships which had changed was that with 
the umbrella organisations the Chartered Institute of Housing in Northern Ireland (CIHNI), and NIFHA. The 
CIHNI continued to deal mainly with its individual members in HAs. The initial response of NIFHA had been 
similar and it had chosen not to engage with DSD on any PGs issues. However, under a new Chief Executive 
this position has changed. NIFHA is now an active participant in the Programme Board and is examining how 
it may become involved in procurement for the sector in its own right through a possible single
procurement group option for non-construction goods and services. 
Within PGs the workload was driven very much by senior staff in member HAs. This was the same whether 
or not the group employed its own staff and whether or not Board members were involved in governance. 
Senior staff were very aware of their responsibility to their Boards, possibly in their minds due to the Helm
report, where Board members had not been kept adequately informed of development activities (DSD, 
2012b)/ oth case study groups͛ decision-making provided for each member association to have one vote, 
whatever their size, which protected smaller associations. However, smaller associations felt more
vulnerable in the political climate where mergers and group structures were being encouraged and were 
responding by considering their options in different ways. 
Therefore the two most important actors in the decision-making environment were the two government 
departments: DFP for overall procurement policy and DSD for monitoring and regulation. The importance of 
state agencies in the policy environment emphasise the degree to which HAs were being treated as public 
competitive approach to the procurement of land and construction works as a package – NIHE is currently
developing a model along these lines’.
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bodies subject to regulatory control rather than third sector organisations whose creditworthiness rested at 
least partly on their independence from government. The comments of a lender were interesting in this 
respect: the establishment of PGs had not led to any changes in their lending decisions, however they did
find the regulation of individual associations to be an important indicator of their financial viability. Larger 
associations were seen as a better risk, and other important factors included. ͚financial strength, experience
and quality of management team, governance͛/ The lender͛s view was that ͚!ssociations in NI can leverage
their ͛S *balance sheets+ further/ They remain a sector that we are keen to lend to͛ *Lender, April 2013].
Despite the highly regulated environment, there was still space for PGs to operate with a degree of 
autonomy, as demonstrated by the differences between the two case study groups. The third sector 
identities of HAs appeared to play a quite limited role in the PGs, however in one case there was an
emphasis on values-based collaboration.
5.6.Outcomes and Key Learning 
The priorities for the PGs were to develop a consultants͛ framework and to prioritise bids from their 
members for the annual bidding round for the SHDP. The original intention was that PGs would develop a 
framework to allow the commissioning of integrated supply teams, covering professional services and
building contractors. Contractual arrangements have been established through professional services
frameworks and maintenance contracts. However, groups had to revise the plan in order to operate
separate frameworks for consultants and contractors, with the contractors͛ frameworks deferred because
under current economic circumstances there is no guarantee of work to the value of the relevant EU
threshold for any one contractor/ Two points were made about this. first, that without a contractor͛s 
framework, PGs were penalised on a maturity grid indicator; and second, that if a guaranteed three to five-
year SHDP was set up then a contractor͛s framework might be possible/ Interestingly, the prioritisation of 
the annual bidding round appears to have gone smoothly despite being arguably the greatest test of the
working relationship.
There were delays in proceeding to incorporate other forms of procurement into the groups, partly due to
pre-existing contracts but also due to cultural barriers because there had been little partnership working
between associations before the Procurement Strategy. The impact of these barriers had probably been 
underestimated and at least partly reflected the imposed nature of the groups rather than building
organically on existing collaborations. The two case study groups had taken different paths here. Case study 
A had remained with new build procurement only, a framework agreement for contractors for all planned 
and cyclical maintenance was being advertised in mid-2012 and a response maintenance service was 
planned to include all except one of the group͛s members. Case study B had established a measured term
maintenance contract for all its members and had also diversified into other areas such as furniture, white 
goods, stationery and food for supported housing. 
Impacts on cost, service delivery and outcomes for users
The Procurement Strategy͛s target of ten per cent efficiency savings over a four-year period had been easily
met (a figure of 17 per cent was quoted by one group) but this is not surprising at a time of declining tender 
values and in cost cases it is hard to determine whether savings can be attributed to the new structures or
to more general market conditions. One group was confident that considerable savings had been made:
We actually have five different contracts now on the maintenance and cyclical services/// so that͛s replacing
over 20 separate contracts that we had previously... that could be up to at a maximum £70 million worth 
extended for the seven years//// we͛ve awarded contracts for consultants to manage the maintenance 
measured term contract, and also we have together issued contracts for planning and feasibility assessment 
on new build schemes.... We also have a common valuation contract so we tender together, get a valuer to 
provide all the valuation services.  Same with insurance and structural warranty we͛ve saved probably up to
£50,000/£60,000 on that.  [Staff member, CSB, 2012]
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There was however some concern that tender costs were being driven down to the extent that quality
might be affected without very careful monitoring on behalf of the client, and that the emphasis on low 
prices might have an impact in relation to product innovation and good design. A particular concern was the
prescribed use of NEC3 contracts, which brought about an increase in compensation events and thus an 
additional administrative burden for the client. There was a particular complaint about the prescription of 
NEC3 contracts for maintenance. Points were made about the additional layer of bureaucracy inherent in 
PGs, which associations had had to fund from their own resources with the exception of training provision
(DSD, 2008). Any consideration of costs and benefits of PGs does not seem to have taken into account the 
additional staff and other costs to HAs. One group was clear that any saving and performance
improvements that had arisen had reflected individual association͛s procurement policy and framework 
rather than the procurement group per se.
On one level, PGs may be said to have delivered in that the SHDP output targets have been met for their 
years of operation, with the exception of 2008-09 (Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4: Social Housing Development Programme outputs 2008-09 to 2011-12
Financial
year
Target Total starts or 
acquisitions
2008-09 1500 1136
2009-10 1750 1838
2010-11 2000 2418
2011-12 1400 1410 
Source: NIHE (2012); 2011-12: target NIHE (2012) and output DSD (2012). 
On the other hand, concerns about quality, including higher maintenance costs that would have to be met
out of rents, cannot be ignored. At worst, these concerns may compromise associations͛ wider values.
They want us to build a box, I can understand it because they want to get that cost down [to] as little as 
possible/  We͛re saying that͛s just not what we do/ [Senior staff, CSB, 2012]
It seems doubtful that such an approach could have been adopted had service users had a greater voice in 
setting the outcomes for the PGs policy. The research found that there was very limited opportunity for
tenants as end users to influence partnership structures, operation or to have a say in what the outcomes 
should be/  Outcomes were being assessed in relation to the !chieving Excellence ͚maturity grid͛ and to
procurement group business plans through the mid-term review. These tools provided only indirect 
reference to user benefits and none to user involvement in the procurement or design process itself. In
interviews it was felt that users͛ interests were included via design quality conformance with the DSD͛s H!
Guide and by post hoc customer surveys. There was little concern amongst interviewees that that by 
separating development procurement from housing management an important user feedback opportunity
had been lost. PGs had not been structured geographically, thus limiting scope for community input into
design. Equally, most associations included tenants on their Boards but with the removal of day to day 
management of procurement from associations, the opportunity for tenant input was reduced. 
5.6.1. Longer term outcomes 
The longer term outcomes of an externally imposed structural change on the HA sector will be the 
consequence of competing institutional logics. On one side, the establishment of PGs was a hierarchical
process with the state very much in control, with a formal commitment to treat HAs as public bodies. On 
the other, government wanted to increase third sector involvement in public service delivery through
partnership working based on trust and equality. While one group moved from reluctant compliance to
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recognising some real benefits through a collaborative trust based process, the other which had initially
been enthusiastic felt that there was little benefit in continuing with their group due to the absence of the 
control based sanctions inherent in a hierarchical approach. This evidence supports the role of trust and
collaboration as essential partnership ingredients and the limitations of an externally mandated approach if 
control sanctions are not maintained.
In line with the TSRC report (Rees et al 2012b), we can see evidence of longer term changes in the
institutional landscape resulting from the life-cycles of imposed partnerships, supply chain relationships and
regulatory interventions.  There is evidence of fundamental change in social housing provision taking place 
due to a small but increasing number of mergers and group structures since 2008. These changes will be 
supplemented by the restructuring of the NIHE, which is likely to impact on existing HA structures as well as
creating a substantial new group of social enterprises to the institutional landscape. Case study participants 
had different views about the future of PGs, reflecting their contrasting experiences of the process:
What͛s the point of partnership working if it͛s not producing anything?
[Senior staff, CSA, 2012].
Even if the DSD tell us, you͛re stopping existing, sorry, ΀S΁ doesn͛t stop existing, because we have contracts 
with a whole range of other organisations. 
[Senior staff, CSB, 2012]
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Third sector housing partnerships
6. Conclusions
6.1.Comparisons and Observations
It might be contended that the two case studies involve such different types of services and serve such
different purposes that comparison between them is of limited value. However the fact remains that both
case study fields involved voluntary and community sector actors in the delivery of public services, and
together these fields account for a significant proportion of state funding of the voluntary and community
sector in Northern Ireland. Furthermore all of the partnerships had a key relationship with the Department 
for Social Development which is also the lead Government Department for relations with the voluntary and
community sector.
It is therefore interesting to conclude by considering the different nature of these partnerships, the role of
external drivers and internal operational issues and to consider innovation and learning and the ways in 
which success can be evaluated.  After comparing our findings in relation to these four research themes we
move on to consider future scenarios, taking into account some developments since the case studies were 
conducted in 2011. We end with a cross-cutting reflection of the wider scenario for third sector housing
partnerships in NI, drawing on the core emphasis of this study on role of voluntary and community sector 
providers in public services.  
6.2.Social Housing Procurement
The research included five objectives (see 3.1), the first four of these are addressed below in relation to PGs. 
The fifth appears separately as part of our consideration of future scenarios in 6.5.
1. To explore the nature of procurement groups as a form of third sector partnership
This objective focuses on the H! movement͛s response to the requirement to form PGs and to be a member 
as a condition of participation in the SHDP. Whatever their experiences of previous collaboration – which
varied – associations had to adapt within the new structures (unless they decided to stop developing), 
which some found difficult. The two PGs we researched in more detail showed different approaches
towards adopting this external agenda – one was initially enthusiastic (as they saw it as an opportunity for 
growth of their own organisation and their wider vision of consolidation within the HA sector) but became 
disillusioned and wanted more control-based sanctions from DSD. The other was a reluctant participant at 
first but adopted a collaborative partnership approach to make it work and was beginning to become aware 
of the benefits of the new partnership by the end of the research period. This group based their operation
on a partnership agreement rather than becoming a legal entity, and adopted a more consensus-based 
approach. It was astonishing to the researchers to see the difference in attitudes over a year, and to see
how the two groups had been able to develop such different identities and a level of autonomy in their 
working practices. Such surprises are rare in research of this nature. 
The first phase of the research in 2011 found most H!s did not give much emphasis to their ͚third sector͛ 
identity and did not participate actively in voluntary sector umbrella groups [Mullins et al 2011]. This 
seemed to be because over time the voluntary housing sector had become institutionalised as a sizeable 
sector in its own right with its own umbrella body and support providers and therefore had fewer external 
links with the wider voluntary and community sector.  However, arguably the procurement group that 
adapted the best did so from a stronger ͚third sector͛ position, illustrating the advantages of developing a 
trust based collaborative approach even if the initial situation was not of their choosing. The overall
experience of forming and working within PGs also prompted further debate within the HA movement 
about organisational responses to the efficiency agenda, supported by a new attitude and engagement with
government from the umbrella body NIFHA. Therefore overall it is likely that this difficult experience has 
strengthened awareness of H!s͛ third sector identity and independence, as well as improving their ability to
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Third sector housing partnerships
participate in debates with other SHDP partners about their contribution to delivering social housing in 
Northern Ireland. 
2. To trace the key drivers for procurement groups
!n analysis of key drivers and associations͛ (and others) responses to them is important as part of reflecting
on the future direction of HA procurement practices. PGs were imposed on HAs as a structural response to a 
number of different policy agendas. There are different views about the degree and effectiveness of 
consultation prior to their introduction, but it is undeniable that our case study PGs felt they had no
alternative than to go along with the requirements as set out in the 2008 Procurement Strategy, which
stated ͚!ll H!s wishing to participate in the SHDP must be members of one of the four recognised PGs͛ 
(DSD, 2008:13). Thus all developing HAs were forced to join one of the newly formed PGs even though for
many this was not the preferred approach to generate procurement efficiencies (with the idea of a single 
procurement consortium already enjoying support in the sector).
A complex and multi-level set of external drivers were evident. The strongest was regional implementation
of EU procurement rules, thus arising from a much wider government agenda at regional, UK-wide and EU 
level. At UK-wide and regional level, other important external drivers were government requirements for
efficiency (tested, for example, through the regulatory system) as well as a wish to support the construction
industry. Within regional housing policy, the 2008 New Housing Agenda and now the 2011-15 Programme 
for Government has set targets for delivery of new social housing and PGs were introduced in order to
achieve these at lower cost without compromising quality. During the case study period there were public 
statements by successive housing ministers advocating a reduction in the number of HAs in NI. This stated
intention inevitably led some to see PGs as a means to achieve this end, although officials involved in 
implementing PGs did not necessarily make this connection.  
It is also important to ask whether there were any internal drivers, particularly after groups had been
formed and were starting to forge working relationships. Arguably the beginnings of an organic move 
towards greater collaborative working in the sector can be detected before 2008, however this was not at a 
level that would have transformed itself into large-scale joint procurement operations without external 
pressure. Equally, there was awareness of the growth of mergers and group structures in England in 
particular, but little enthusiasm to explore these options in Northern Ireland. However, once it became clear 
that PGs were going to happen, different attitudes towards them as a concept and also towards 
organisational approaches were found within the HA movement. The umbrella body, NIFHA, had been 
concerned about the implications of PGs for sector governance and for its own relationships with individual 
associations. While it had been involved in its own procurement efficiency initiatives it was not perceived to
be supportive of the DSD agenda on PGs. Efficiency was also a concern of HAs, of course, and closer working
through the PGs has opened up new possibilities which have led to some mergers and group structures. 
3. To review their operation, relative advantages and any barriers to their effectiveness
The operation of PGs has not been an easy experience for those involved. The process of forming PGs was 
sometimes difficult and one group folded because its members were unable to work together. However, 
PGs were set up within the required timescale and have generally met their targets. The two case study PGs 
took different approaches to indications from DSD that PGs should move towards a single development 
team: the lead HA in one PG wished to do this but was frustrated by internal politics; and the other PG took 
a consensual and creative approach which resulted in an ͚integrated͛ development function with some 
similarities and some differences to a single development team. The Board members of constituent PG
members in both groups continued to make funding and programme decisions for their individual HAs and
thus preserved the autonomy of their organisations. The two PGs differed in their involvement of member 
HA Board members, with the more trust-based PG including Board members in the decision-making process 
without appearing to blur the distinction between the responsibilities of Board members and paid staff. The 
lack of service user involvement in the Procurement Strategy and in PGs was striking. This lack of 
accountability to service users tended to reinforce the hierarchical power relations imposed by the
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Third sector housing partnerships
procurement process and further compromise third sector identity. Key actors in the process appeared to
place some faith in standardised systems for customer feedback, but did not promote the active 
involvement of users in the design and construction of social housing. 
It is hard to assess the ͚relative advantages͛ of PGs because we do not have a comparator either in terms of 
a small group of associations continuing to operate on their own, or a large merged association of group
structure operating its own procurement system independently from PGs. We know PGs made savings 
against a very low target, however this was at a time of falling construction costs and intense competition
within the construction industry, and so these might have been achieved without the new structure. The 
question of whether the client role has become more onerous, therefore transferring costs from contractor 
to client, was also raised. This perspective uncovered an important point of contention. There was a strong
view expressed from several HAs that the PGs process was cost-driven. The possibility of reducing design
standards for social housing in the Draft NI Housing Strategy (DSD 2012a) highlights that this issue will 
remain current/ This was contested by DSD who took exception to the comment on ͚building boxes͛ (page
47)/ There is clearly an ongoing debate about the degree to which ͚real͛ procurement savings can be made
as opposed to savings that become higher project management or repairs and maintenance costs. 
The most obvious barrier to effectiveness was the low trust environment, which manifested itself between
various key actors: between the DSD and PGs, but also within PGs at times during the process and most 
specifically within one of the case study PGs at the time of our research. A second barrier was the unstable 
policy environment, with political messages about the desirability of HA mergers causing uncertainty about 
the length of time PGs would exist. More recent and upcoming policy changes such as the restructuring of
the NIHE, the draft Housing Strategy and welfare reform also caused concern. A third barrier was a sense 
from the PGs that they were excluded from decision-making on the future of the policy, however this may
change with the more active participation of PG members and also NIFHA in the Procurement Strategy
Programme Board. A fourth issue consisted of a number of points related to access to private finance:
concern from associations that their treatment as de facto public sector bodies in relation to public 
procurement policy damaged their status as independent organisations and hence their ability to borrow; a 
contrary view from the DSD and a lender that HA regulation provided a safeguard; and the move towards 
bond finance requiring loans to be taken out on a larger scale which is an emerging contributory factor 
towards mergers and group structures. None of these are directly related to PGs but they contribute
towards a sense that the policy field in Northern Ireland has not yet adjusted fully to the new lending
environment, which is likely to continue for some time.  
A final point, which has acted as a barrier to effectiveness although we suspect unintentionally, has been 
the complex and contradictory responses to the hybrid nature of HAs - from DSD, the NIHE, and from HAs 
themselves. The status of HAs as independent third sector bodies was not acknowledged by the majority of
other actors in the social housing policy field or in public procurement policy. However, most HAs also did
not emphasise their third sector credentials or participate in wider third sector networks. It is interesting to
speculate that the difference in perceptions about the process between HAs and the DSD may be a
byproduct of the hybrid nature of HAs. On the one hand, we see associations being treated as public bodies, 
with the regulatory and policy-making body seeking to control them in the same way as the NIHE. On the 
other, we see associations͛ status as independent third sector organisations acknowledged, for example the
͚hands off͛ approach of DSD during the formation of the PGs/ However, in neither case do we see effective 
partnership working.  
4. To consider their role in innovation and ways in which their success can be evaluated
PGs have required Northern Ireland͛s H!s to work in new ways and to confront new dilemmas/ For 
example: methods of PG partner selection, whether PGs should be legally constituted or work under a 
partnership agreement, whether development teams should be ͚single͛ or ͚integrated͛, and the extent of
involvement of Board members in PG decision-making. It is clear that the combination of new working
relationships in PGs and wider changes that continue to impact on HAs have stimulated a new approach to
mergers and groups structures, as described in section 6.5.2 below. It is difficult to assess whether these
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Third sector housing partnerships
developments would have taken place without PGs, but the stipulation from DSD (at the time of the 
research) that any mergers should take place within PGs created a new restriction. Further change was 
evident in the role of the umbrella body NIFHA, which moved from an oppositional position to greater
engagement in the procurement policy agenda/ The change in NIFH!͛s approach raises the possibility that 
the Procurement Strategy Programme Board becomes a more important arena for progressing innovation
(ideally by consensus) in social housing procurement. 
PG performance was being evaluated via the !chieving Excellence ͚maturity matrix͛ and the ongoing
development of KPIs. However, these indicators did not constitute a full cost benefit analysis of the process 
of structural change including the extra staff and equipments costs; nor has there been a qualitative analysis 
of the process prior to this report. In non-financial terms, the new collaborative structure has opened up
opportunities for joint working, but has closed down other possibilities of partnerships between HAs in 
different PGs.
6.3.Supporting People
Conclusions from the Supporting People case study are now presented in the same format to enable
comparisons.
5. To explore the nature of SP partnerships as a form of third sector partnership
The partnerships in the ͚Supporting People͛ programme were built around the relationship between a 
voluntary sector support provider and a HA. They were much less complex than the procurement 
partnerships discussed above, but there were clear tensions and points of stress. In both case studies 
relationships had developed over a period of years and were able to draw on high levels of trust that these
relatively stable ties had built up as a resource to help overcome difficulties.  This particular feature of the
partnerships was an important point of stability in an arrangement that might otherwise have been
problematic for both internal and external reasons.
The key internal problem was the difference in scale between the SP support providers and their HA 
partners. This inevitably put the SP support providers at a disadvantage as there was always relatively more 
at stake for them in negotiations. This was quite starkly illustrated in the homelessness case study where,
although relations were reported as good, the support provider was conscious of the considerably higher 
level of risk it carried if a scheme failed. The exposure to risk was all the greater because unlike the HA
partners, with large stocks of general needs housing and relations with significant numbers of different
͚Supporting People͛ partners, the schemes in the programme were to a lesser or greater extent the core
business of the provider agencies. It was also apparent in the field of mental health that SP funding had
significantly changed and radically increased the scope of support organisations͛ remit and roles/  For some,
as in the case of the scoping interviewee quoted above, cost reduction pressures and competitive threats 
within the programme were seen as having the potential to close the agency down.  
6. To trace the key drivers for SP Partnerships
Analysing the drivers of change or stability is crucial for understanding the strategies adopted by the
support providers. In both the case studies the stability of the partnerships relied heavily on the long-term
negotiated nature of the relationships. In both instances the NIHE had brokered the arrangement based on
judgements of who was best placed to deliver the service, once the need for it had been identified, and in 
doing so was able to draw on prior experience of working with the agencies involved. However, this was not 
a recipe for stasis, since the homelessness provider had originally been brought in from outside NI because 
of its expertise in working at the extreme needs end of the homelessness spectrum, and now had a
successful track record in NI which led to its selection for the case study scheme. The stability derived from
continuing policy relevance of the programme and its own institutional history of successful development in
its current form provided a crucial underpinning for the operational security of the partnerships.
The policy environment was restricting as well as enabling. This was particularly noticeable in the limited
ability of providers to control of the intake and discharge of people using the schemes in both the 
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Third sector housing partnerships
homelessness and mental health fields. In the case of homelessness, the local NIHE office was a crucial
intermediary between local need and the service provided and this had impacted on the mission focus of
the agency involved as well as where it took referrals from. In the context of the homelessness strategy, 
restricting SP interventions to two years tended to push the agency towards an identity not of its own 
choosing/ Similarly in the case of the mental health agency, stability had been ͞bought͟ at the cost of 
locating the scheme within an institutionalised environment ultimately controlled by NHS psychiatric 
practice.  Its comfort at aligning its charitable objectives with this loss of direct control became the basis of 
its success in this field. In both cases the policy drivers were enabling these agencies to adopt public 
sector/third sector hybrid forms
The public policy framework understood in the broad sense adopted in this report had a similar effect. 
While formal audit and regulation mechanisms were embraced by these successful partnerships, there were
challenges from the wider structure of relations with the state. Threats from changes to Housing Benefit 
and moves from intelligent commissioning to more competitive procurement were viewed as potentially
destabilizing. 
7. To review their operation, relative advantages and any barriers to their effectiveness
The increasingly unstable external operating environment of rising costs and frozen budgets set the context
for some key internal processes in the case study partnerships. The central dynamic of these relationships 
was driven by the increasing commercial funding of the capital costs of schemes developed by HAs. 
Although supported housing schemes were still attracting high levels of grant, this was not the case for the 
larger general needs programmes that tended to affect H!͛s institutional logics most. The need to repay
private loans put pressure on the HA partner to ensure sufficient rent income to cover loan servicing in 
addition to ongoing maintenance and other operational costs. Typically as well, joint management
agreements that set out the terms of the partnership placed the risk of voids in properties with the support
provider, in that rent had to be paid in respect of units whether or not there were tenants in occupation.  
The insistence of DSD in clawing back surpluses in any particular financial year left less room for manoeuvre
and prevented the SP support providers from acting as social enterprises. 
Both the provider agencies had important assets to deploy in securing their position that related to their 
civil society or charitable roots as well as their reputations for delivering good services of the kinds required.
In day to day operation of partnerships these resources proved a great asset – the gym in the attic – the 
pervasive culture of working with those no-one else will – the recognised competence and professionalism –
the ability to make small moves away from institutionalisation even for the highest need groups where 
security and safety remains a dominant concern. However, these advantages did not appear to be fully
recognised or supported in policy circles, and this was symbolised by proposed moves away from intelligent 
commissioning towards more competitive procurement processes. 
8. To consider their role in innovation and ways in which their success can be evaluated
Given budget constraints over the past four years, it is perhaps significant that the SP programme has
proved as resilient as it has, although a series of recent reviews have led to a greater sense of instability in 
the policy environment. Recent consideration has been given to moving the health related SP budget to
health and social care. DSD evaluated the SP programme in 2010-11 (DSDNI 2011) and reviewed the 
Commissioning Body in 2011-12 (DSDNI 2012), while NIHE commissioned a strategic review of SP funded 
homelessness schemes (North Harbour Consulting 2012) in preparation for publication of the 2011-15 SP
strategy. 
Nevertheless, the rolling forward of the SP strategy itself to 2015 is a reflection of its continued importance 
for meeting social policy objectives for community based support services for vulnerable people.  NIHE has
recently published a new homelessness strategy and has sought to use the SP programme as the main
means of meeting the health and social care objective of closing the remaining long stay hospitals. The 
structure of the programme has aided the stability of the partnerships responsible for delivering the
programme, particularly the commitment to supporting long-term relationships with approved support 
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providers in the commissioning process.  The absence of potential competitors based outside Northern
Ireland has also helped maintain these relationships.
The key current measures of success rest on external and internal monitoring of quality; in both cases this 
includes the QAF system used by the NIHE to audit service quality and related internal audit methods 
developed by the providers themselves. In the case of the mental health provider, a further tier of 
regulation was provided by the Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority with the power to close
schemes down. These measures of success all place quite strong emphasis on the quality of support 
provider to users. Interestingly, they were not seen as a significant burden by the two case study providers, 
indeed they were seen as an important integral part of delivering their social mission. Where there were 
compliance problems these related to providing evidence of service user engagement in governance, 
reflecting a general weakness recognised across these partnerships. 
Greater problems were encountered with other measures of success related to efficiency, value for money
and the interaction of these measures with the long term sustainability of SP partnerships. There was a 
strong view in the homelessness case study that the financial basis on which the case study scheme had
developed was based on inadequate funding from SP grant, but particularly from HB. As a consequence the 
provider had taken the unusual step of writing a 3 to 6 month notice period rather than the usual 12
months to protect itself from underfunding risk.  This raises questions about the long term sustainability of
the model from a financial perspective. 
The wider context for this funding uncertainty relates directly to hybridity and the relationship between 
government commissioners and third sector providers. On the one hand independent SP providers are seen
to offer advantages in their ability to harness charitable and CSR funding and volunteers. On the other hand
there is a reluctance for these inputs to be used to subsidise state contributions to service costs, but to use 
these instead for ring-fenced additional services such as the ͚gym in the attic͛/ In a final twist there were
concerns about the limitations of SP as an annual grant which is regarded as a payment for specific services 
provided, and any unspent elements of which are to be returned rather than held as a surplus to manage
risk and mitigate against higher costs or lower income in the following year. This was seen as limiting the 
scope for providers to act as social enterprises and to innovate to reduce and reinvest savings along with 
financial contributions secured from non-governmental sources. 
6.4.Developments since the case studies
The case studies were completed in autumn 2012 during a period of considerable turbulence for the 
governance of housing in Northern Ireland. In editing the material for this final report we have tried to
incorporate as many recent developments as possible though we recognise the field we have studied is
constantly evolving and the landscape in which housing organisations in Northern Ireland will negotiate 
future partnership options will continue to change/ We anticipate that as in G there will only be ͚messy
solutions͛ for future partnerships/ 
Notable developments since the case studies include the publication of NI͛s first housing strategy - Facing
the Future: Northern Ireland Housing Strategy 2012-17 (DSD 2012).  This proposes lower grant rates and
quality standards for social housing along with higher rents and exploration of ͚innovative models͛ for 
additional funding and the possibility of allowing 'for profit͛ private sector developers to access grant 
funding (DSD, 2012a).
DFP͛s Performance Efficiency Delivery Unit (PEDU)- with a service improvement and efficiency remit in all 
public services) has recently undertaken a confidential review of the SHDP. With the initial five year period
of the Social Housing PGs coming to an end, this wider thinking about the SHDP is likely to have a 
considerable impact. 
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Work has continued to progress on NIHE͛s Future Role following the fundamental review in 2011 (Price
Waterhouse Coopers, 2011) and the Ministerial decision announced in January 201320 to separate 
strategic from operational roles and to develop ͞a new landlord function͟ undertaken by an as yet 
unspecified number of new housing organisations. This would clearly have significant consequences for the
structure of the existing HA sector, the possibilities for more effective procurement arrangements across 
the enlarged sector, and set a different context for the SP partnerships.
Some welfare reforms have been implemented in NI and more are to come after the passing of the current
Welfare Reform Bill. Welfare reform is developing broadly in line with British policy. The next 
comprehensive spending review is likely to set an even more austere financial landscape in which future 
partnerships will be negotiated. There is therefore likely to be a premium on innovation and exploiting the 
advantages of the independence and ability of voluntary and community partners to harness non-state 
resources while engaging with civil society more fully. This would suggest the potential to develop less 
unequal relationships between commissioners and support providers and to enable support providers to act 
more as social enterprises than as controlled voluntary organisations.
All of these very recent developments may be of greater significance for future partnership scenarios than
the recent experiences outlined in this report. Nevertheless the learning outlined here provides an 
important basis on which to plan responses to the radically changing environment. 
6.5.Future Scenarios
6.5.1. Supporting People
There are a number of pressures on the system that may destabilise it in the medium term. Continuing
budgetary constraints, coupled with a NI Executive policy to extend public procurement to further publicly 
funded services from 2013 onwards could lead to significant moves away from the intelligent
commissioning approach that has so far underpinned generally positive and long standing partnerships in 
this field.
A move to procurement and the temptation to shift the cost: quality weightings in procurement decision
making in response to the budgetary constraint could lead to a number of major changes in the form and
nature of SP partnerships. This might include a rapid consolidation of the support provider sector. Inability
to compete and extensive risk of financial failure may lead to a spate of forced mergers, take-overs and the 
retreat from the field of the smaller providers in particular. Social enterprises with a trading model are more
likely to be successful and indeed could benefit from the removal of current grant related conditions
regarding the reinvestment of surpluses and year on year transfers. This could enable them to better exploit
the flexibility of moving from a grant to a fee model of financing.  
Impending changes to the housing benefit regime that currently provides the financial underpinning of the
entire programme are likely to accelerate these changes.  There could be significant changes to the 
membership of the partnerships through which the programme is currently delivered. Reflecting
inequalities in size and power, this is likely to have a disproportionate effect on the support providers. 
Those involved in the provision of lower level support needs may be most at risk of internalisation of these 
services by HAs, effectively ending provision of such services through partnerships. This could have
important impacts on service users who would be more beholden to a single provider involved in both 
regulating their tenancy and setting their rent and providing essential support, there could be a loss of 
independent advocacy roles currently performed by some support providers.
20 
 http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/Assembly-Business/Official-Report/Written-Ministerial-
Statements/Department-of-Social-Development-Fundamental-Review-of-the-Northern-Ireland-Housing-
Executive-NIHE   
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The case study evidence illustrates the current pressure points on the operation of the partnership
structure through which the programme is currently delivered and gives an indication of how the impact of 
these changes will start to be felt.  It is likely that the SP programme will look very different in four or five 
years time to the way it looks now.
6.5.2. Social Housing Procurement Groups
It is probable that PGs will not continue in their current form at the end of the five-year Procurement
Strategy due to a number of factors. First, SHDP targets are being reduced, raising further questions about 
the number of developing associations and also the logic of continuing with three PGs. Second, grant rates
are decreasing, which has raised issues about the treatment of HAs as public bodies for procurement 
purposes in Scotland and England. Third, the process of organisational merger and group structures is 
accelerating. At the time of the research we were aware of two mergers (one small HA with a larger one;
and two smaller HAs with another larger one) and one group structure (one large HA which had formed a 
group with three smaller HAs). However, at the time of writing there are several other changes under 
consideration, several of which appear to be group structures initially but with a view to potential merger.
These include: two examples of one small HA and a very large one; one of three small HAs operating within
a particular area of high housing need; and one medium sized and one large HA. The latter example is the 
first such partnership between HAs in different PGs and may signal the beginning of a more flexible
approach from the DSD towards future economies of scale. Access to bond finance may be an additional 
driver here. Finally, the current increase in stock transfer opportunities from NIHE stock, and the further 
large scale NIHE restructuring, will continue to dramatically change the landscape and dynamics of the
sector and provide new opportunities.
These factors generate a number of future scenarios for procurement in the social housing sector, which
include the following three options. First, and most likely in our opinion given the relatively small size of the 
HA sector in Northern Ireland, a single procurement group might make much more sense in enabling
savings from scale while preserving a degree of organisational autonomy. Alternatively, PGs could be a 
voluntary rather than mandatory approach to procurement, perhaps allied to an Investment Partner
certification process as in England/ ! ͚third way͛ would be to exempt H!s or group structures over a certain 
size from the requirement to join a procurement group. It is becoming clearer that these options exist 
within the wider context of a substantial change in the balance of social housing provision from NIHE to
HAs, possibly including HAs new to Northern Ireland, or group structures including HAs from different parts 
of the UK. 
6.5.3. The Wider Scenario for third sector housing partnerships in Northern Ireland
Accelerating change is the main characteristic of public services in the period since the Global Financial
Crisis of 2008. Radical reforms in the delivery and management of services are being adopted in response to
the need to control the deficit and respond to the consequences of budget reductions in key areas such as
social housing, social care and welfare benefits.
These reforms take on a specific regional character in Northern Ireland where the NI Assembly has asserted
a distinctive agenda and style of working that has impacted significantly on housing policy and wider policies
for the voluntary and community sector.  There is an imbalance between the influence of cross-government
policies to engage the voluntary and community sector in public service provision through the Concordat
and the more powerful role played by Departments in procuring, commissioning and regulating providers 
from the voluntary and community sector.
In many places the third sector has been welcomed as a partner in providing potential solutions to some of
the dilemmas arising from the need to redesign and reconfigure services, achieve budget reductions while 
sustaining a degree of public support and engagement. However, often this has been seen as a cloak for 
opening up services to large scale private contractors who are better resourced to compete for large 
contract lots and payment by results. Experience of the Work Programme in England indicates that the
advantages offered by third sector contractors are significantly diluted when they are in weak positions 
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down the supply chain. It has been indicated that the Westminster Government has learned from this 
experience and will be modifying its approach to payment by results projects in the criminal justice sector.
However, some observers are sceptical about whether third sector organisations can maintain
distinctiveness or whether large-scale commissioning leads to isomorphic pressures on all types of 
commissioned organisations. 
The process of undertaking and receiving comments on this report has heightened our awareness of the
degree of unsettlement that is being experienced by all of the actors involved in these reform processes. For 
us there is clear evidence in NI that voluntary and community organisations, particularly in the SP case 
study, do bring distinctive contributions in relation to values, additional resources and professional 
reputation. Meanwhile the PG case study provides telling evidence of the importance of trust-based 
collaboration as the main success ingredient for successful partnerships and the need for time rather than
external control for such trust to flourish.
However, a striking feature of both case studies was the limited voice and influence enjoyed by service 
users in either partnership design or outcomes. If voluntary and community sector organisations claim
distinctiveness in connecting with civil society, there is a need for more convincing responses to that 
society, for example through opportunities for co-production or personalisation, than found in the two
cases studies. 
It is therefore important that future approaches to partnerships build on the lessons of this report and do
not sacrifice this distinctive contribution for short term gains in efficiency and standardisation. In the longer 
term the added value that these organisations can provide will be of even greater importance. Managing
with fewer resources while maintaining a degree of social order will require support providers that harness
civil society links rather than weakening these links through marketisation and top-down regulation. Once 
lost these specialist third sector inputs will prove almost impossible to replace; however a sustainable 
platform for the future will also require greater voice and influence for service users than either case study
demonstrated.
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